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ABSTRACT
This thesis critiques public finance economics from an Austrian school 
perspective. The critique employs property rights and Austrian method and 
economic theory.
Chapter I provides a brief discussion of Austrian method. This is an 
important chapter because most of the criticisms offered in this paper 
spring from the Austrian school's unique method.
Chapter ii explains the property theory that will be used throughout 
this paper. This chapter argues for an uncompromising property rights 
theory that views the state as a criminal aggressor.
Chapter ill examines the foundations of pubiic finance and subjects 
them to Austrian analysis, in some instances these theories will be critiqued 
to the point that they are no longer of use to the analysis in Chapter IV. In 
others, an improved Austrian version will be provided.
Chapter iV looks at specific theories within public finance and 
explains how they fall short of value-free Austrian economics.
Ill
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INTRODUCTION
Unlike most sub-disciplines of economics, public finance oversteps 
ttie bounds of value-free economics. On ttiis, Biock writes:
Not only is normative economics embraced, it is done so witti 
aiocrity, and wittiout apoiogy. That is, most textbooks on the 
subject start off the with one or several chapters w h ich  
attem pt to justify taxation on moral, efficiency, and other 
grounds. This occurs in no other field.i
Not only do public finance authors casuaiiy moke vaiue judgments, 
they provide no ethical foundation for doing so. This paper provides an 
ethicai foundation compatible with the Austrian school of economics. This 
foundation, combined with Austrian method, will be used to critique the 
theories that justify taxation.
1 Block, "Pubiic finance texts cannot justify government taxation," p. 225.
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CHAPTER \
AUSTRIAN METHOD
Austrians believe the methods of the natural sciences are 
inappropriate for the sciences of human action. What separates the social 
sciences from the natural sciences is purposeful behavior: Human action is 
motivated and cannot be isolated in a laboratory, Or, as Mises writes: "We 
are never in a position to observe the change in one element only, all other 
conditions of the event remaining unchanged."2
Another principle of the Austrian school is tha t of m ethodoiogicai 
individualism, This principle is straightforward: Ail actions are performed by 
individuals.3 The state, society or other groups do not hove ends, neither 
do they act.^ For example, if a terrorist organization assassinates a 
politician, it is not the organization that kills the politician but specific 
individuals within the organization. The same principle applies to the state. 
It is not the United States tha t invades another country but specific 
individuals in the armed forces acting on behalf of the government.
Since human action does not lend itself to  em pirical testing 
econom ic theory must be the product of logical deduction. Austrian 
theories are deduced from the incontestable axiom of action. This axiom 
states that man acts, it may seem obvious and somewhat simplistic, but it 
says far more than those unfamiliar with the axiom would e.xpect. implicit in 
every action are the categories of values, ends, means, cho ice , 
preference, cost, profit and loss, as well as time, time preference, 
uncertainty and causality. These are not apparent until one understands 
what it is to act. Until then, the actions of individuals appear merely as 
motions.5
2Mises, Human Action, p. 31.
3|bid„ p. 42.
^Rothbard, Man, Economy and State, p. 2. 
SHoppe, Praxeology and Econom,\c Science, p. 21
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Every action is on attem pt to remove uneasiness. An individual acts 
because tie wisties to move from a less satisfactory state to a more 
satisfactory one. in doing so, tie must utilize scarce resources. These must 
include at least time, his body and the land upon which it stands.
Why one chooses one action over another is not the subject of 
economics, but of psychology, it is unimportant to the economist to know 
why a choice was made. All that matters to him Is tha t a choice was 
made.
An individual must choose how to employ his means. Will they be 
employed to get a sandwich or go to the movies? This will depend on the 
valuations of the actor. At any point in time an actor has a ranking of oil 
courses of action under his consideration. This list is ranked ordinaily and not 
set in stone. For example, at one point in time, the individual may value 
drinking beer more than working. At another point in time, the ranking may 
be reversed. These scales only manifest themselves In human action.
Once the actor chooses his most valued option he must also 
determine how to attain it, A plan is needed. The most valued recipe is the 
one that will be selected. The actor must also evaluate and attain control 
over the means called for in this recipe so that he may attain his end.* 
Objects are not means because of their chemical or physical composition. 
It is the human mind that makes an object a means and human action 
which implements the means.
Ends can either be Intermediate or terminal. For example, the 
atta inm ent of a master's degree can be an intermediate end with the 
terminal end being the attainment of a doctorate. But each end is sought 
after because the actor believes once it is reached it will leave him in a 
more satisfactory state of affairs.
By choosing one action over another an actor shows preference. If 
the action chosen does not remove the actor's uneasiness, he incurs a 
psychic loss. Conversely, if the action removes the uneasiness then the 
actor reaps a psychic profit.
it is important to note that an individual not only attempts to maximize 
his money income, he attempts to maximize his psychic income and this 
includes m oney os well os nonexchangeab le  goods. These
*Herbener, "The Role of Entrepreneurship in Desocialization," p. 80.
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nonexchangeable goods consist of subjective nontangible elements that 
cannot be separated from certain actions,
For example, an individual may have the opportunity to work for two 
organizations, one the state, the other a private firm. The Income the 
individual could earn in the state position may be twice that of the private 
sector job. But the individual may loathe the state so much that any 
increase in income over the private sector job cannot entice him to take 
the state position. FI is action is completely rational. By choosing the private 
sector job, his psychic income is maximized. Given the choice between 
two positions, on actor will choose the position with the highest monetary 
income, ceteris paribusJ
Action implies causality. By acting an individual demonstrates that he 
believes he can interfere in the concatenation of events and a ffect 
change. One would not act if he thought he was powerless over the world 
around him.
That one must choose what to do at any point in time proves the 
existence of uncertainty. Without uncertainty man would never hove to 
affirm one path of action and deny another, Fie would merely go through 
life as an automaton, never having to choose.
That one consumes proves the universal fact of time preference, i.e, 
he prefers obtaining a good in the present more to receiving the some 
good in the future. If this preference did not exist, the actor could abstain 
from consumption indefinitely.® Because of this preference, ail goods 
received in the future trade at a discount to the same good in the present. 
An Individual who placed a large discount on goods received in the future 
would have a high time preference and one who placed a small discount 
on future goods would have a low time p r e f e r e n c e . 9
7Rothbard, Man, Economy and State, pp. 183,186,191.
®Mises, Human Action, p. 484.
9Time preferences determine the ratio of consumption to investment. The 
lower the time preference, the greater the proportion of money aiiocated 
to investment, and vice-versa. These preferences change throughout 
one's life. Children have high time preferences. They would rather spend 
money right away instead of waiting for a future return. Later in life, time 
preferences tend to lower os Individuals mature and as providing for one's 
future comes into ploy. At retirement, time preferences tend to raise as 
one has little time left to live and money unspent after death will be of no 
value. This increase may be moderated by bequests. The degree to which
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The action axiom provides a soiid and irrefutable foundation for the 
entire edifice of economics because one cannot attem pt to dispute it 
without at the same time proving it. To disprove the axiom one would hove 
to employ scarce resources (at least time, one's body and the land upon 
which it stands) and utilize them to attain the end of disproving the axiom. 
One would have to act. Theories that flow from the action axiom are o 
priori and must logically foiiow unless a flaw in the reasoning e x i s t s . This 
process of deduction is coiled praxeology. Economics is the most 
developed branch of praxeology.
Theory of Subjective Value
The full integration of the subjective theory of value into economic 
theory differentiates Austrians from non-Austrians. Austrians shun the 
concept of objective costs whether they be social costs, benefits or 
transaction costs. They are all equally invalid.n These concepts cannot be 
derived praxeoiogicaily and are therefore of no im portance to the 
Austrian. This, no doubt, prevents many economic errors from the start.
The cost of any action is the most valued opportunity foregone, the 
opportunity cost. Opportunity costs vary from individual to individual and 
have values attached to them that cannot be measured in any objective 
sense. They cannot be added, measured, nor com pared be tw e e n  
individuals. Murray N. Rothbard illustrates:
His [an actor's] cost is his second-highest ranking end, that Is, 
the value of the highest ranking end that he has foregone to 
achieve a still more highly valued goal. The cost that he incurs 
in his decision, then is only ex ante; as soon os his decision is 
m ade and the cho ice  is exercised and his resource 
com mitted, the cost disappears, it becomes on historical 
cost, forever bygone. And since it is impossible for any 
external observer to explore, at a later date, or even a t the
government subsidizes retirement also has an effect on time preference as 
do taxes. Many factors play a role in the formation of one's time 
preference. See T. Alexander Smith, Time and Public Policy and Edward C. 
Banfield, The Unheaveniy City Revisited. 
lORoppe, Praxeology and Economic Science, p. 24 
n Rothbard, "The Present State of Austrian Economics," p. 9.
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same time, the internai mentai processes of the actor, it is 
impossible for this observer to determine, even in principle 
what the cost of any decision may have b e e n . ''2
Utility is necessarily subjective and unmeasurable. For something to 
be measurable, it must be extensive in space so everyone con agree to 
the size of the unit in question. Utility's intensive nature does not lend itself to 
extensive observation and m easurem ent.A ssum ing  this restriction did 
not exist, any unit of measurement would still be entirely arbitrary as 
different individuals would place different values on the unit of measure. 
Cardinal utility measurement has no legitimate place in economics.
The low of decreasing marginal utility is derived praxeoiogicaily. The 
first unit of a homogeneous supply of goods will be put to the actor's most- 
valued use. The second such good will be put to use for the actor's 
second-highest valued end, and so on. The first homogeneous good will 
then have the highest value of the group, os it will be used to attain the 
actor's highest valued end. The second will hove a lower value, as the end 
to which it con be applied is ranked lower. This is true because at any point 
in time on actor has a unitary scale of choices.
It is important to understand what an actor determines to be a 
homogeneous supply of goods is not decided by some physical or 
chemical criteria, it is entirely subjective. For example, an actor may have 
a supply of guns, oil of which are physically different. But to him, ail may be 
of equal serviceability, in this case, even though the guns are physically 
different, the actor considers them homogeneous. A supply of goods is 
considered homogeneous from the viewpoint of the actor if, to him, they 
are of equal serviceability.
if one has to give up a unit of a homogeneous supply, he will give up 
the one applied to his lowest-valued end. As this unit is given up, the value 
attached to the marginal unit of his supply has increased as it now has a 
higher value attached to it than the end that could be achieved with an 
additional unit. This is the law of increasing marginal utility.
i2Rothbard, "The Myth of Efficiency," p. 93
T3Rothbard, Toward a Reconstruction of Utiiity and Welfare Economics, p. 
18.
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7The law of marginal utiiity has nothing to do with the psychological law 
of satiety of wonts. Each subsequent good of a homogeneous supply has a 
lower value attached to it because it can only be applied to uses the actor 
deems less important than his most valued end. The law of marginal utility is 
entirely praxeoiogicai.i^
From the law of marginal utility, the laws of supply and demand are 
iogicaiiy deduced. These laws hold in ail situations and cannot be refuted 
by historical experience.
Voluntary Exchange
When two actors engage in bilateral exchange, it is because they 
believe they will benefit ex onfefrom  that exchange. Exchange requires 
reverse preference orderings, that is, Actor A values what he is to receive 
from Actor B more than what he gives up, and vice-versa. Without reverse 
preference orderings (except in cases of involuntary exchange) an 
exchange would not take place.
Thus, one con soy with opodictic certainty ail voluntary action ex 
ante  accrues psychic profit to all parties in the exchange. Of course, one 
or more of the actors may realize ex post they have not benefitted. Man's 
lack of omniscience prevents him from always making the right choice. But 
this is in no way limited only to the free market; it plagues all man-made 
institutions.
The free market minimizes mistakes by providing an immediate test: If 
an individual purchases an item he does not like, he knows in the future that 
he ought not purchase it again. Furthermore, private consumer 
organizations and publications help individuals determ ine whether a 
purchase will meet their expectations.
1'* Samuelson writes: "As you consume more of the same good, your total 
(psychological) utility increases. However, let us use the term marginal utility 
to refer to 'the extra utility added by one extra last unit of a good.' Then with 
successive new units of the good, your total utility will grow at a slower and 
slower rate because of a fundamental tendency for your psychological 
ability to appreciate more of the good to become less keen." (Economics 
[1976], p. 433.)
TSRothbard, Power and Market, p. 20.
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8Ceteris paribus
Ttie deductive nature of econonnics places great importance on ttie 
cefe/’/spo/’/bus restriction, it is essential to any praxeoiogicai analysis and its 
careful use differentiates ttie  Austrians from others. Since the economy 
cannot be isolated like atoms in a scientist's labora to ry, thought 
experiments using this restriction are integral to Austrian theory. Economists 
must mentally theorize a change in the economy (a price control, for 
example) while holding ail other variables constant and then logically 
deduce its effects, in this sense, economics is truly an armchair science. 
No experimentation or field work is required.i* Ail praxeoiogicaily derived 
economic theories are true ceteris paribus.
Wertfreiheiti7
Economics is a science of means not ends. It cannot tell us whether 
the ends are just or good, only if the means employed are appropriate to 
achieve the ends desired.i® in addition, an economist cannot conclude 
that a certain policy or action must be undertaken without smuggling a 
norm into his reasoning: Value judgments do not foiiow from strictly 
economic statements.^ 9
i*Statistics do have a use, although a limited one, in economics. They can 
illustrate but not prove a theory because correlation is not causation. 
Furthermore, their use, like that of historical events, can make economics 
more interesting.
''^Neutrality with regard to all value judgments.
'®Mises, Theory and History, pp. 28-29.
'^Hoppe, A Theory of Socialisrvi and Capitalism, p. 194.
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other Schools of Thought
Method separates Austrian economics from other schools.
The process by which praxeoiogicai theories develop Is outlined as 
foiiows;2o
1. Axioms
2. Deduction
3. Laws
4. Understanding
5. Historical analysis
This is in contrast to how theories develop from empiricism-positivism:
1. Assumptions
2. Deductions
3. Lows
4. Testing
5. Empirical facts
6. Historical episodes
Praxeoiogicai and empiricist-positivist theories also differ in the nature 
of their pronouncements. Theories deduced from the axiom of action ore 
qualitative in nature as opposed to the quantitative nature of empiricist- 
positivist theories. But this is not because Austrian theories are somehow 
deficient or inferior. Rather, Austrians posit that individuals don't respond to 
the world around them like robots. Their actions change over time with 
changes in tastes and knowledge, individuals can respond to the some set 
of circumstances differently over time. This point is illustrated by Mises:
Deluded by the idea that the sciences of human action must 
ape the technique of the natural sciences, hosts of authors 
are intent upon a quantification of economics. They think that 
economics ought to  imitate chemistry, which progressed from 
a qualitative state to a quantitative state. Their motto is the 
positivistic maxim: Science is measurement. Supported by rich 
funds, they are busy reprinting and rearranging statistical data
2®This is taken from a lecture on method by J. Herbener at the Mises 
University 1990.
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provided by governments, trade associations, and by 
corporations and other enterprises. They try to compute the 
arithmetical relations among various of these data and thus to 
determ ine what they call, by analogy with the na tu ra l 
sciences, correlations and functions. They faii to realize that in 
the field of human action statistics is always history and that the 
alleged "correlations" and "functions" do not describe anything 
else than what happened at a definite time in a definite 
geographical area as the outcome of the actions of a definite 
number of people. As a m ethod of econom ic analysis 
econometrics is a childish play with figures tha t does not 
contribute anything to the elucidation of the problems of 
economic reoiity.^i
The present, or the immediate past, is part of history. History cannot 
prove or disprove a theory; it can only illustrate a theory. History is full of 
events that follow one another. Any relationship between two or more 
events can be found. In addition, every historical experience is open to 
myriad interpretations. Economic history has no theoretical importance 
without praxeology. Praxeology, not history, must be used to form 
economic theories.
Empirical theories con never be as certain as those of praxeology for 
they are forever hypothetical. Some variable can always be discovered 
tha t m ight exercise some control over the elements explained. To 
empiricists and positivists, even the low of demand is empirical. As an 
empirical law, it is subject to falsification if contrary evidence is discovered. 
To the praxeologist, the law of demand is known with opodictic certainty 
and cannot be disproved by any historical evidence, it holds so long os 
individuals act.
Similarly, empiricist-positivists consider the theory of voluntary 
exchange hypothetical, is testing required to determine that both parties 
expect to benefit, have opposite preference orderings and exchange 
goods of unequal value? This is absurd to anyone who knows what it is to 
act.
This is not the place to go into on in-depth discussion of empiricism- 
positivism. Nor is this the purpose of this thesis. Suffice to say, these theories
21 Mises, The Ulfimafe FoundatiGn of Economic Science, p. 63.
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have been severely riddled with holes, yet they nevertheless remain today's 
prominent methods ,22
The reliance on empiricism-positivism as a m ethodo iog ica i 
foundation has no doubt played a role in the negative view of economists 
held by the pubiic. Economists, with their countless quantitative predictions, 
hove led many to discount oil economic assertions as mere conjecture. 
This has had an enormous impact on the type of policies supported by the 
pubiic os they eschew sound economic principles and rely on gut feelings 
instead for the outcomes of potentiaiiy disastrous economic policies.
22$ee, in particular, Hoppe, Praxealogy and Economic Science.
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CHAPTER II
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Central to any schiool of economics, but conspicuously missing from 
most, is a coherent theory of property rights. The theory used for this thesis 
is that developed in Hans-Hermann Hoppe's A Theory o f Socialism and  
Capitalism. The theory is called argumentation ethics and is summarized as 
foilows.23
Scarcity necessitates a system of property rights. That all goods are 
not superabundant, such that one's consumption does not limit or reduce 
one's or another's future consumption, is bound to cause conflict. Property 
rights would be unnecessary in a Garden of Eden, where oil goods exist in 
superabundance, as no conflicts over use would o r is e .2 4
But property rights ore required for people's bodies. Bodies ore 
scarce resources, i may wish to do something with my body while another 
may also wish to do something with it a t the same time. Conflicts are 
inevitable. Property rights are necessary to avoid these conflicts.
Ail truth claims (including the petitioning of rights) must be brought 
about and decided upon through the process of argumentation. This 
statement, like the axiom of action, renders oil counter arguments 
contradictory. To argue against it, one would hove to orgue the truth claim 
that one does not hove to bring truth claims about through argumentation.
No one would ever engage in argument if he did not implicitly 
believe intersubjectively meaningful norms existed. For example, no one 
would argue if they believed the other party would resort to  murder if a
23See, in particular, chapter 7; Hoppe "The Justice of E co n o m ic  
Efficiency,"and "The Ultimate Justification of the Private Property Ethic." 
Hoppe's derivation of property rights is exclusive to him but his conclusions 
ore not. See Rothbard, For A New Liberty and The Ethics of Liberty.
24Here the Garden of Eden means only a land of superabundance. No 
other Biblical connotations are impiied.
12
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disagreement was reached. Arguing assumes both parties can agree to 
disagree.
What are the criteria used to determine these norms? First, they must 
pass the universalization test, i.e., the norms must apply equally to all parties 
without exception. Passing the universalization test is necessary -  but not 
sufficient -  os any number of norms, no matter how senseless or 
contradictory, could be formulated to conform with this rule. For example, 
norms requiring everyone to smoke while simultaneously requiring that ail 
smokers be punished would both pass this test.
Everyone, while arguing, assumes he has exclusive control over his 
body. Moreover, it is assumed neither party will kill or otherwise physicoiiy 
harm the other. This follows from the nature of argumentation os a 
practical affair and conflict-free method of interacting.
This norm, summed by the non-aggression principle, also passes the 
universalization test. The principle states everyone is free to do whatsoever 
he desires with his property, so long as he does not uninvitedly aggress 
against the physical integrity of another person's property (note that one's 
body is the most basic form of private property), in addition, any act 
delimiting an individual's right to act non-invasiveiy would be considered an 
invasion.
It must be noted that one can only own the physical integrity of his 
property and not the value of it. Values are subjective and imputed onto 
goods and services through the valuations of individuals. These values can 
change from one moment in time to another, if one had the right to own 
the value of property, an individual could resort to coercion if the 
valuations of others changed and lowered his property values.
The same analysis can be applied to the value of one's services, if 
producer B entered the market and thereby lowered the value of 
producer A's services, A would have the right to stop B from invading his 
value. The mere existence of another individual on the labor market (or 
any other market for that matter) could be considered an act of invasion. 
The only way to rectify this "invasion" is to permanently maim the second 
laborer to prevent him from working or to kill him. But this contradicts the 
norms implicit in argumentation.
Moreover, the right to own one's value or the value of one's property 
implies that before anyone could a c t he would have to check with oil
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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others to determine whether his actions wouid reduce the value of anyone 
else's property. By the time he had finished questioning everyone, their 
values could have changed. Ail action wouid come to a shrieking halt.
What of property rights referring to things other than individuals? 
Individuals must be able to appropriate goods to survive. To argue 
otherwise would be self-contradictory because to argue, one has to be 
olive, and to be alive, one has to hove consumed resources.
There are two methods of appropria ting unow ned goods: 
homesteading and verbal declaration. No middle ground exists. The 
principle of verbal declaration fails the rigor of argumentation ethics since it 
wouid never be agreed upon through the course of argumentation, if 
both parties held this principle, then the first to state he owned the other 
would be the rightful owner of the other. (The same tactic could be used 
to appropriate all the property of another.) One party would be the master 
and the other the slave. But this contradicts a norm implicit in all acts of 
argumentation, the right of seif-ownership.
In addition, before one could even invoke the principle of verbal 
declaration, he wouid hove to assume control over his body. One cannot 
declare ownership over things without using one's vocal chords. Therefore, 
one cannot assume property rights over himself through declaration but 
only through homesteading.
Homesteading is the only just method of appropriating property, it 
establishes an objective, intersubjectively controllable link between a 
person and his property. This principle simply states that the first-user of on 
unowned resource is its owner. The first user of a person's body is that 
person. And the first user of any other property (unappropriated land, etc.) 
is also its rightful owner.
Individuals cannot claim to lose from the homesteading done by 
others because the fact that they did not homestead those unowned 
resources tells us they did not view them as valuable. If they did, they 
wouid have homesteaded them.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
15
Furthermore, the producer of a good is its rightful owner because 
the good is his creation, He has transformed homesteaded resources by 
"mixing" them with his labor in the Lockean s e n s e , 25
The principle of voluntary exchange is a coroiiary of the 
homesteading principle. Individuals have the right to engage in any 
bilateral exchange so long as the exchange does not violate the physical 
integrity of an uninvoived third party or his property. Any attempt to delimit 
one's right to exchange would violate the nonaggression axiom.
Exchange under this system is essentially an exchange of property 
titles. Contracts are enforced because the failure to uphold one's end of a 
contract is tantamount to theft. That is, one party has taken ownership of 
another's property title, but has not relinquished the property title of the 
good he agreed to give up in exchange. Promises, on the other hand, 
could not be enforceable as a breech of promise does not imply theft. 
Contracts in nonexchangeabie goods such os one's liberty could be 
entered into but not enforced. One's freedom, unlike the title to car or plot 
of land, cannot be exchanged. Liberty is inalienabie.2*
According to this property rights theory, animals have no rights. They 
are merely technical problems. One cannot reason with a lion or 
cockroach about property r ig h t s .2 7  | cannot argue with a cockroach 
about trespassing or aggressing against my property. But I can do anything 
within my power to prevent the creatures from entering my property or
25Mises writes: "Production is not an act of creation; it does not bring about 
something that did not exist before. It is a transformation given elements 
through arrangement and combination. The producer is not a creator. 
Man is creative only in thinking and in the realm of imagination, in the world 
of external phenomena he is only a transformer (Human Action, p. 140)." 
2*One could enter into a slave contract but this could never be enforced, 
i.e., the "slave" could not be forced to work. But if the "slave" stopped 
working he wouid be liable for the funds of work yet undone. Further, the 
"slave owner" could stipulate in the contract that should the "slave" refuse 
to be a slave, the right to a certain sum of money wouid be relinquished. 
(Rothbard, Tfie Ethics of Liberty, pp. 133-148).
27The rights derived from argumentation ethics wouid apply to all individuals 
regardless whether a specific individual has the capacity to argue. For 
example, handicapped individuals would have the same rights. Similarly, 
one who lost his ability to argue through disease or accident wouid stiii 
have the sam,e rights as all others.
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exterminate ttie  ones aiready on my property, so iong os my actions are in 
accord witti ttie nonaggression axiom,28
Governments, by virtue of ttieir existence, violate the principles of 
homesteading, production and voluntary exchange, No one gives money 
to the state v o l u n t a r i l y , 29 As a result, the state must obtain property through 
coercion or threat of coercion. The most common form is t a x a t i o n . ^ o
in addition, states exercise invasive control over individuals and their 
property by invoking the principle of verbal declaration through autistic, 
binary and triangular i n t e r v e n t i o n . 8 ' '®2 Examples include taxes, licenses,
280n animal rights, Biock states: "Alternatively, if animals are to have rights, 
they must at least show that they respect the rights of human beings. That 
is, if the lion claims the right not to be hunted by us, then, we must both get 
up unharmed when the human and the lion lay down together. Why should 
we do more for the lion (or the bear or others beloved by the animal 'rights' 
organizations) than it is willing to do for us? ("Environmental Problems, 
Private Property Rights Solutions," p. 307.) Perhaps human sensitivity training 
is in order. In addition, if one argues that ail living beings are to have rights 
this would have to extend not only to animals but also to bacteria and 
viruses. To be iogicaiiy consistent, animal rights activists wouid hove to 
refrain from using antibiotics, deodorant and other "anti-iife" products. 
290ne exception is the purchasing of government debt. But only this side of 
the transaction is voluntary. The debt must be repaid with funds obtained 
through taxation or another form of expropriation.
80|f you don't think taxation is involuntary, try not paying taxes.
81 On the typology of intervention, Rothbard writes: "What type o f 
intervention can the invader commit? Broadly, we may distinguish three 
categories, in the first place, the intervener may command an individual 
subject to do or not to do certain things when these actions directly involve 
the individual person or property alone. In short, he restricts the subject's 
use of his property when exchange is not involved. This may be called an 
autistic intervention, for any specific com m and directly involves only the 
subject himself. Secondly, the intervener may enforce a coerced  
exchange  between the individual subject and himself, or a coerced "gift" 
to himself from the subject. Thirdly, the invader may either compel or 
prohibit an exchange between a pair of subjects. The former may be 
coiled a binary intervention, since a hegemonic relation is established 
between two people (the intervener and the subject); the latter may be 
called a triangular intervention, since a hegemonic relation is created 
between the invader and a pair of exchangers or would-be exchangers. 
The market, complex though it may be, consists of a series of exchanges 
between pairs of individuals. However extensive the interventions, then, 
they may be resolved into unit impacts on either individual subjects or pair 
of individual subjects. "(Power and Market, p. 11)
82AII governments must be ouf/aw governments by definition. They cannot 
function without violating their own legal rules. Citizens are prohibited from
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patents, conscription, regulations, welfare, eminent domain and monopoly 
grants. Gun control, zoning, antitrust, labor and drug laws also fall under this 
typology.
using coercion against others unless in self-defense, yet government uses 
non-defensive coercion everyday against individuals that operate within 
the parameters of the nonaggression axiom. These delimitations can only 
be viewed as invasions.
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THE FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC FINANCE
Perfect C o m p etitio n
Perfect com petition  is the ideal state of com petition  that 
governm ent policy attempts to achieve. Under this model market 
conditions th a t fail short of pe rfect com petition  ideals reflect a 
shortcoming of the market rather than the model and call for government 
intervention.
Under perfect com petition, there exists perfect information, 
homogeneous products, no advertising and enough sellers such that no 
single seller is large enough to exercise "monopoly power:" the ability to 
achieve a higher total revenue by taking advantage of demand inelasticity 
by restricting production and raising price.
Entrepreneurs in the perfect competition model set production at 
the point where marginal cost equals price. Moreover, every producer 
faces a perfectly horizontal demand curve, thus making a monopoly price 
unattainable.
But what we experience in reality is much different from the perfectly 
com petitive model. The law of decreasing marginal utility dictates that 
every producer faces a downward sloping dem and curve. The demand 
curve for the individual firm under perfect competition defies logic. A flat, 
perfectly elastic, demand curve would mean tha t if the firm lowered its 
price by one cent no product wouid be sold. Moreover, it is impossibie to 
aggregate the flat curves of perfectly-competitive individual firms and 
arrive at a downward-sloping curve for the industry. For this to occur would 
imply that the curves are not perfectly elastic, but slope downward.
In addition, products are differentiated, no one has p e rfe c t 
information, firms advertise and every seller has some control over price.
18
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
19
Several elastic and inelastic stretcties exist ttiroughout the producer’s 
demand curve. Entrepreneurs set production quantities at the most 
remunerative ievel, given their perceived demand curve. The curve can 
never be known with absolute certainty, and can change from one point in 
time to another.
This uncertainty limits the accuracy of these production forecasts, 
and, with this in mind, the entrepreneur sets a price for the product such 
that the range of demand above the price is elastic; any increase in price 
would lead to a lower net revenue.
If the entrepreneur discovers he can increase his revenue by 
producing less and raising prices, then he is guilty of charging a monopoly 
price.
But this situation is not as c lear-cu t as it may seem. It is 
indistinguishable from one in which the demand for the product has 
increased, making the original price subcompetitive. The higher price, 
then, is not a monopoly price, but merely the new com petitive price. 
Moreover, it cannot be said this restriction is harmful to consumers 
because, by definition, it must be met by a oorresponding expansion, either 
into the production of other goods or the production of leisure, which is 
also a good. Thus, the only prices that can arise on the free market are 
free-market p r ic e s .3 3
Consumers exert a great deal of pressure over free-market prices. 
Any elastic or inelastic stretch along a product's demand curve is entirely 
due to the voluntary demands of consumers. If consumers feel a price is 
too high, they need only reduce their demand for the product and the 
price will be forced to drop or the producer will be left with a surplus.3^
Moreover, why wouid producers hove incentive to produce at the 
point where marginal cost equals price? It makes little sense tha t a 
producer would want to produce a good at 15 cents, for example, and 
turn around and sell it for 15 cenfs. Production would oocur at the point 
where marginal cost is iess than price, not equal to p r ic e .3 5
33Hoppe, "From the Economics of Laissez Faire to the Ethics o f 
Libertarianism," p. 57.
34Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State, p. 564.
35There is another restriction. Mainstream economists assert that 
entrepreneurs will try to get the last penny out of an investment. But in
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Neither does the efficient functioning of the market require perfect 
or full knowledge. Mainstream economists assert that because man does 
not have fuli market knowledge, the outcomes of market interactions are 
flawed and require state intervention, Not so. Humans are imperfect, 
accordingly, their knowledge and actions fall prey to their weaknesses. But 
this so-called "failing" plagues not only the market. It plagues all institutions 
that man has a hand in, even government.
Humans have different aptitudes, skills and levels of knowledge. Far 
from hindering the proper functioning of the market, human differentiation 
is an asset, it provides a role for the entrepreneur. Perhaps this is why man's 
lack of fuli knowledge bothers the mainstream economist. The actions of 
entrepreneurs oannot be mapped or forecast with mathematical formulas. 
Entrepreneurs are unpredictable. The entrepreneur uses the knowledge of 
his products and potential customers to forecast which goods will be 
valued higher in the immediate or near future. Those entrepreneurs that 
are better able to forecast future demands will outperform those less apt.
Information need not be evenly spread am ong all market 
participants. Take the labor market, for example. Suppose only employers 
know their employees discounted marginal value product (DMVP) and 
employees do not. An example: Joe Public is hired by a firm to perform a 
job where his DMVP is equal to $10 an hour. The firm, realizing that Joe 
Public has no idea of his DMVP, pays him only $4 an hour. Another 
employer noticing the $6 differential entices Joe to work from him at $4.50 
an hour, all the while not telling Joe of his true DMVP. Another employer 
realizing the differential is moved to hire Joe for $4.75. This process ends 
when Joe receives his DMVP or close enough to it that no entrepreneur 
has an incentive to lure him from his present empioyer.36
reality this is far from true. What the entrepreneur seeks is a maximum rate 
of return on his principal. Therefore, if the extra income that his increased 
production nets him is less than he could get in other markets, e.g., the 
money market, there is little incentive for him to increase his production. 
36Biock, "Public finance texts cannot justify government taxation, " pp. 234- 
235.
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Monopolies, Cartels and Mergers
Mainstream economists contend free-market monopolies are 
deficient because of allocative and technical inefficiency. With monopoly 
power, consumers pay more than the marginal cost of products, and firms 
have no incentive to produce to the point where price equals marginal 
cost. Mainstream economists also contend that these firms have no 
incentive to be efficient because of a lack of direct-seller rivolry.^^
In the matter of one-firm monopolies, and all firms in general, it must 
be realized that there is no objective method for determining optimal firm 
size. The size of the firm is a matter for the entrepreneur and not the  
economist to decide. Suffice to say that firm size and market share are 
reflections of overall efficienoy rather than monopoly power.^s
If it should happen that one firm dominates a market to the exclusion 
of all others, the situation con only be the result of the voluntary demands 
of consumers. If the firm is earning economic profits -  a return above the 
interest rate -  then over tim e entrepreneurs will move from lower- 
remunerative industries to this higher-remunerative one. AN this will tend 
toward the equalization of profit rates among all industries.
Moreover, the firm's dom ination is entirely subordinate to the 
demands of consumers. If people feel the firm's products or services are 
inadequate or over-prioed, then they are free to patronize other firms or 
go into direct competition themselves with the dominant firm.
Cartels, like one-firm monopolies, face similar scrutiny. There is little 
difference, however, between the original formation of a corporation and 
a cartel or merger (if a merger comprises the firms of an entire industry, 
then it is similar to the formation of a permanent cartel).3?
All cartels, corporations and mergers pool assets into a common lot 
to increase monetary return. The direction of this lot is put under the oontrol 
of a oentrol organization. Initially, the only difference among the three is
37Armentano, Antitrust Policy: The Case for Repeal, p. 18. 
38Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State, p. 576.
39|bid., p. 573.
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that the asset pool of a corporation consists of monetary assets while the 
asset pool of cartels and mergers consists of capital-goods assets. Yet 
cartels have one serious disadvantage over corporations: They are 
inherently less stable because they face  both internal and external 
pressure, while corporations face only external pressure, The least efficient 
firms in the cartel arrangement benefit at the cost of the more efficient 
through the preservation of market s h a r e s . ^ o
In the absence of cartelization, the more effic ient firms would 
increase production and gain in market share at the expense of the iess 
efficient. An incentive is given to the more efficient firms to engage in 
under-the-table competition, particularly through the use of rebates, a 
form of internal pressure. So long as the cartel is voluntary, the threat of 
external pressure is ubiquitous.
Horizontal mergers and joint ventures are aliowed if they pass the 
"rule of reason." Whether social benefits (cost savings in production and 
distribution, as well as in financing, industrial research and product 
development) outweigh social costs (the possible restriction of output) is 
dependent upon whether the merger or joint venture will create market 
power, which is determined by relevant market and market share 
analysis.41
Even if one were to assume that monopoly power could produce 
any deleterious effects on the free market, relevant market and market 
share analyses are particularly unscientific and arbitrary. Relevant markets 
are difficult to define. What ore the "reasonable substitutes" for soft drinks: 
coffee, tea, fruit juice, beer, milk? What should the g e o g ra p h ic a l 
boundaries of these markets be? Regional, national, i n t e r n a t i o n a l ? ^ ^
One method used to determine relevant markets is cross-price 
elasticities. It is impossible to determine whether the motivating factor 
behind change in demand for one product was realiy the change in the 
price of another. Furthermore, these figures are merely historical data and 
can change from one moment to another.
Market share is also used to determine whether monopoly power will 
be created but these determinations are made without the support of any
40|bid., pp. 572-3.
^lArmentano, Antitrust Policy, p. 55. 
42|bid., pp. 57-8.
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rational econonnic theories. Who is to know whether monopoly power for 
a specific firm begins at 34% or 34.8%?43
Almost any pricing practice can come under the scrutiny of antitrust 
authorities. High prices are called monopolistic. Firms that charge simiiar 
prices can be accused of collusion. Low prices are signs of cutthroat 
competition or "prioe discrimination." All are seen as ways of atta in ing 
monopoly prices.
More often that not, firms that charge low prices are accused of 
trying to gain in market share through the financiai destruction of their 
competitors. Why should an inefficient firm be aliowed to maintain its 
market share if it cannot serve the consumers as effic iently as its 
competitors? Consumers con easily chastise firms by refusing to patronize 
them. By patronizing the cutthroat competitors they are demonstrating 
that they see nothing wrong with the current state of affairs. Moreover, the 
bonanza of bargain prices can hardly be seen as injurious to consumer 
welfare.
An argument can be made that once the firm manages to wipe out 
ali of its competitors, it will resort to monopoly prices. This is dependent, 
however, upon two factors: (1) that all firms in the industry are driven out of 
the market and (2) that the product's demand curve is such that it permits 
the monopoly firm to attain a monopoly price. Even if these criteria are 
met, it is still unlikely that the monopoly firm will receive such a price, for 
reasons already mentioned.'^
Often, the winner of a price war will not be the larger firm because 
smaller firms, usually unburdened by large investments, are more effective 
at cutting costs. Even if all firms are driven out of the industry there is no 
way, short of government intervention, of prohibiting new firms from  
entering and competing for the monopoly profits.46
Moreover, a smaller firm can shut down until a monopoly price is 
obtained, then reopen. Even if the smailer firm shouid become bankrupt, 
new entrepreneurs can always purchase the existing plant at bargain 
prices, giving the new entrepreneur a particularly powerful advantage.
^3|bid., pp. 58-9.
^Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State, pp. 601-2. 
45|bid. p. 602.
^Ibid.
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Thus, if a monopoly firm wishes to retain its newly attained market share, it 
must keep prices low otherwise i t  will invite new c o m p e t i t i o n ^ ^
Rather than identifying a monopoly as a single-firm industry or one 
that has monopoly power, the definition should be restricted to those coses 
where free entry is prohibited by government privilege.
P areto  Superiority
An action is Pareto superior if no one's condition can be improved 
without worsening the condition of another. As it stands, Pareto optimality 
endorses the status quo as the implicit ideal, for "the goodness of free 
contracts or unanimously approved changes from the existing situation 
depends completely on the goodness or justice of the existing situation 
/fse/f."^8 If a current regime is invasive, the criterion only freezes this injustice. 
For example, to remove a price control would worsen the situation of the 
beneficiaries of that control, thus failing the Pareto optimality criterion. Any 
attem pt to repeal invasive laws and regulations would come to a grinding 
holt.49
What is missing from the criterion is a starting point from which to 
begin our analysis. When the institutions of homesteading, production and 
voluntary exchange are affirmed, every action resulting from these 
principles would be Pareto superior by definition.
Boodway and Wildasin write "[T]he efficienoy of the allocation of 
resources is to be judged ultimately by the Pareto principle with reference 
to  the preferences of ail individuals in society rather than using the 
preferences of some independent organic entity called 'the S t a t e . '"^ o Yet 
their call for state coercion belies their adherence to the Pareto principle.
No government action can be Pareto superior. The coercive nature 
of government actions must violate the voluntary preferences of society. 
Otherwise, no coercion would be required.
47lbid., pp. 602-3.
‘'^SRothbard, Ethics o f Liberty, p. 203.
49|bid., pp. 203-205.
—Boadway and Wildasin, Pubiic Sector Economics, p. 56.
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The Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle fails as an attempt to shore 
up the weaknesses of the non-Austrian version of the Pareto principle. 
Under this principle, economists can pronounce that an action increases 
social welfare if the winners can (but don't have to) compensate the losers 
and still remain winners.
Actual, not potential. Increases are what is im portant to  the 
economist. Only when the actual losers are compensated can we then 
discover whether they are no longer losers. Since the winners cannot 
examine the utility scales of the losers they must rely on the losers word for 
the proper amount of compensation.
But what happens if one or more individuals assert tha t no 
remuneration, monetary or otherwise, can elevate them from their loser 
status? The existence of one lone intransigent anarchist could halt all 
government actions.
The problem with the compensation principle is that is impossible to 
tell what has happened to anyone's utility. Only if the individuals under 
consideration actually had the choice between two alternatives could any 
welfare pronouncement be made. If an actor choose alternative A over 
alternative B, we would know that the actor believed he would benefit ex 
ante. As Rothbard notes since "the ac t of compensation is, necessarily, a 
unilateral gift to a person rather than an act o f that person. ..it is impossible 
to estimate how much his utility has increased as compared to its decrease 
in some other situation.
Efficiency
The efficiency criterion is often employed to justify government 
intervention. But efficiency is only operative in relation to specified ends. 
The question is, whose ends ore to be followed? Public policy decisions are 
based on the utilitarian belief that ail ends are really the same: Everyone 
seeks a higher standard of living. This common end is supposed to lend 
credibility to the scientific nature of these decisions.
51 Rothbard, Toward a Reconstruction o f Utiiity and Weifare Economics, pp.
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The definition of what constitutes a higher standard of living is 
subjective. Some may desire more government programs, others iess and 
some none. Some prefer population reductions, others increases. Some 
want clean air, some couldn't care less. The list is endless.
Therefore, if ends conflict there is no scientific method of determining 
what is or isn't efficient. No additive concept among conflicting ends is 
possible. Any concept is necessarily arbitrary and non-scientific. Rothbard 
illustrates that even when reduced to the individual, efficiency is non­
operative.
Let us take a given individual. Since his own ends are clearly 
given and he acts to pursue them, surely at least f?/s actions 
can be considered efficient? But no, they may not, for in order 
for him to ac t efficiently, he would hove to possess perfect 
know ledge-perfect knowledge of the best technology, of 
future actions and reactions by other people, and of future 
natural events. But since no one can ever have perfect 
knowledge of the future, no one's action can be called 
"efficient." We live in a world of uncertainty. Efficiency is 
therefore a chimera.sz
Acting is always a learning process. Individuals constantly evaluate 
and reevaluate their values and goals. An actor's knowledge of how to 
pursue his ends con always improve but can never be truly "efficient" 
because he lacks omniscience.
This view of efficiency explains why some firms, newspapers for 
example, remain in business even though they frequently lose money. If the 
owner's end is not monetary but ideological, then the newspaper may well 
lose money year after year, yet still remain efficient from the viewpoint of 
the owner.53
Efficient solutions minimize social costs. But why should social costs 
be minimized? And at what price should social costs be minimized? 
Economics tells us such costs exist. But it does not follow from purely 
econom ic statements that they should be reduced. The word "should" 
inserts an ethical decision into the analysis.
52Rothbard, "Comment: The Myth of Efficiency," p. 90.
53This situation is primarily limited to privately-held firms as the investors of 
pubiiciy-owned firm,s usually have monetary ends.
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Moreover, Austrions insist that it is ridiculous to talk of reducing costs 
since all costs ore necessarily subjective and non-quantifiable, How con 
something that cannot be measured be reduced? Efficiency analysis 
should be abandoned in favor of ethical principles as they provide a much 
stronger foundation for public policy d e c is io n s . 5 4
Ind ifference Curves
Central to modern non-Austrian economio analysis is the indifference 
curve. These curves have uses ranging from determining Pareto efficient 
outcomes to finding optimal taxes.
Indifference curves are drawn on two- or three-dimensional graphs. 
Either dimension represents one good or a bundle of goods. A curve that 
represents an individual's preferences is smooth and convex with respect 
to the origin. The actor is indifferent between any two or more points along 
the curve.
The point of tangency between the indifference curve and the 
budget line determines the allocation that will be chosen. Budget lines are 
determined by the price of each good in relation to the actor's income.
The points along the line are arrived at through observing an actor's 
preferences. But this is futile. No one can tell what choices an individual will 
make until he acts. There is no substitute for actual human action.
A truly indifferent actor will not aot. The m oment he acts, 
indifference is thrown by the wayside and preference is shown, thus 
proving he was not, in fact, indifferent. Indifference cannot be proven 
through action.
A greater problem lies in the use of indifference curves for policy 
decisions. Assuming these curves have some validity, to argue that they 
have validity other than at the point the actual preferences are mapped is 
tenuous. An actor may choose to rank A above B and B above C at one 
point in time. But this ranking can change from moment to moment.
Here constancy is confused with consistency. An a c to r 's  
preferences must be ordinal such that A is preferred to B and B to C. With
54Rothbard, "Comment: The Myth of Efficiency," pp. 90-95.
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this ranking, the actor will choose A. This ranking is good only a t the 
moment the actors chooses A. To assume that the actor will in the future 
have the same rankings implies constancy. So long as an individual can 
learn or change his mind there is no reason to assume this.
The use of smooth lines also lends itself to difficulties. An actor is 
supposedly indifferent between any combination of goods along the line. 
Any movement along the line, no matter how infinitesimally small, is possible. 
Therefore a basket of goods containing 5.565656 liters of beer and .30025 
bratwursts is theoreticaily possible. But humans don't act on infinitesimally 
small quantities if they are incapable of discerning them. They ac t on 
discrete quantities.
Taking this into consideration, the indifference curve is no longer a 
curve, but a set of points or stretches. There is no tangency point and 
consequently no use for the diagram.
As a theoretical foundation, indifference curves are wrought with 
logical error, Any analysis utilizing them is questionable.ss
Utility a n d  Social W e lfa re  Functions
Utility and social welfare functions can justify actions of the state on 
the grounds that they reflect welfare gains. In describing the workings of 
the social welfare function, Boadway and Wildasin write; "This illustration [an 
example on a previous page] is only conceptual in the sense that the social 
welfare function is not known, and cannot be known on the basis of 
economic reasoning a l o n e . "56 Despite their misgivings, they proceed with 
the function in their discussion of taxation.
Utility and sociai welfare functions cannot pass the rigor of 
praxeology. The use of functions in economics has been wrongly imported 
from physics. Unlike the behavior of atoms, human action cannot be 
summarized by mathematical functions. Human behavior is purposeful and 
can change from moment to moment with changes in knowledge and 
preferences. There is no reason to believe that the preferences upon
55Rothbard, Toward a Reconstruction, pp, 13-15. 
56Boadwoy and Wildasin, Public Sector Economics, p. 32.
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which these functions are modeled will hold for any periods of time other 
than those at which the actions took piace.57 There are no constant 
relations in the sciences of human action.
The survival of ordinal utility functions is understandable, but the 
adherence to cardinal utility functions is inexcusable. Boadway and 
Wildasin assert that "[cjardinai measurability is familiar as being the way in 
whioh temperature, height, weight, etc. are m e a s u r e d . "58 Not so. 
Temperature, height and weight are all quantities extensive in space. Their 
units of measurement are also extensive in space so that everyone can 
agree to the size of the unit used.
But utility is different precisely because it is intensive rather than 
extensive in space. No one can see u t i l i t y . 5 9  No scale or ruler of utility 
exists. Even if one did exist it would fail because everyone would p lace 
different values on the unit of measurement in question.
Giving utility and social welfare functions more than short schrift 
bespeaks the forlorn state of economics. The farther one wanders from 
the axiom of action, the closer one borders the frontiers of crackpot 
economics.
57Qn this. Mises writes; "The attempt has been m ade to attain the notion of 
nonrational action by this reason; If ois preferred to b and b to  c, logically a  
should be preferred to c. But if actually c is preferred to o, we are faced 
with a m ode of acting to which we cannot ascribe consistency and  
rationality. This reasoning disregards the fact that two acts of an individual 
can never by synchronous. If in one action a  is preferred to b  and in 
another action b  to c, it is, however short the interval between the two 
actions may be, not permissible to construct a uniform scale of value in 
which a precedes b  and b precedes c. Nor is is permissible to consider a 
later third action as coincident with the two previous actions. All that the 
example proves is that value judgments are not immutable and that 
therefore a scale of value, which is abstracted from various, necessarily 
nonsynchronous actions of an individual, may be self-contradictory." 
(Human Action, p. 103.)
58Boadway and Wildasin, Pubiic Sector Economics, p. 272.
59Some may ob ject that neither can temperature be seen. On the 
contrary, temperature is measured by the effects it has on mercury. A 
higher level of mercury on the thermometer denotes a higher temperature 
and vice-versa (Rothbard, Toward a Reconstruction, pp. 18-19).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
30
Consum ers' a n d  Producers' Surplus a n d  D e a d w e ig h t Loss
The concepts of consunners' and producers' surpluses enable 
economists to determ ine deadweight losses resulting from government 
policies. Consumers' surplus is the difference between the price buyers 
pay for a good and the maximum price they would have paid. Producers' 
surplus is the difference between the price sellers receive for a good and 
the minimum amount for which they would have sold it. A deadweight loss 
is the dollar value of the loss in utiiity due to monopoly.
An assumption behind this analysis is "prices can be interpreted as 
monetary measures o f marginai benefits o f goods to househoids and o f 
tiie  marginal costs o f production...[J]h\s is because househoids allocate 
their income among the purchase of various goods in such a way that the 
marginai value in monetary terms equals the price for each good."^
This assumption fails on two counts. First, prices cannot measure 
marginal benefits. Second, there is never an equalization of v a lu e s .^ i  
Exchange occurs because both actors have reverse p re fe re n c e  
orderings: Each actor values the good he is to receive more than the good 
he gives up.
Another incorrect assumption underlying this concept is that the 
value of a dollar to each household is the s a m e . 52 Again, how could the 
econom ist determ ine whether this was the case? This requires
ôOBoadway and Wildasin, Pubiic Sector Economics, p. 34. Emphasis added.
51 Rothbard, Man Economy and State, p. 260.
52What follows is an example of how ludicrous this notion can become. 
Samuelson writes: "How is the concept of consumer's surplus used? It is 
sometimes needed to help make correct social decisions. Suppose a new 
branch road would cost your town $100,000. Being free to all, it is 
expected to bring in no dollar revenues, and all the utility it give to eaoh 
user will represent his consumer's surplus. (To avo id  extraneous 
interpersonal difficulties, let us assume there are 1,000 users ail exactly alike 
in income and in their benefit from the road, and ail equally worthy.) If 
each such similar man enjoys $100 (the road's per capita cost) or more of 
consumer's surplus form the road, they should all vote to build the rood. If 
the consumer's surplus of each is less than $ 100, it is uneconomical for them 
to tax themselves for this pubiic project." (Economics [1976], p. 439.)
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interpersonal utility comparisons, Ttie subjectivity of utility, as has been 
illustrated, prevents this.
Every individual places a different value on a dollar and the value 
changes in relation to one's supply of m o n e y . 6 3  in addition, the value 
placed on a dollar can change from one moment in time to another. It is 
impossible to know the value individuals attach to these surpluses because 
subjective values cannot be aggregated.
Deadweight loss fails as an attempt to measure the dollar amount of 
the loss in utility due to m o n o p o l y . 64  This would imply the ability to 
interpersonally examine utility levels. From the viewpoint of praxeology, all 
nonaggressive actions on the free market result in non-quantifiable utility 
surpluses while all government actions involve utility losses.
63This does not justify any judgments regarding the value of a dollar to a 
millionaire in comparison to that of a bum. Any such decision would imply 
interpersonal utility comparisons.
64Block, "Public finance texts cannot justify government taxation," p. 231.
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CHAPTER IV
THE THEORIES OF PUBLIC FINANCE
The State
The state is of particular importance to the public finance economist, 
because without it he could not implement his theories, Since Musgrave is 
perhaps the most popular among the public finance economists and his 
books the most widely used, his texts will serve as an outline for criticism. He 
lists some of the reasons for the necessity of the coercive sector:
1. The claim that the market mechanism leads to efficient 
resource use (i.e, produces what consumers want most and 
does so in the cheapest way) is based on the condition of 
competitive factor and product markets. This means that there 
must be no obstacles to free entry and that consumers must 
have full market knowledge. Government regulation or other 
measures are needed to secure these conditions.
2. They are needed also where, due to decreasing cost, 
competition is inefficient.
3. More generally, the con tractua l arrangements and 
exchanges needed for market operation cannot exist without 
the protection and enforcem ent of a g o ve rn m e n ta lly  
provided legal structure.
4. Even if the legal structure were provided, and all barriers to 
competition were removed, the production or consumption 
characteristics of certain goods are such that these goods 
cannot be provided for through the market. Problems of 
"externalities" arise whioh lead to "market failure" and require 
solution through the public sector.
5. Social values may require adjustments in the distribution of 
income and wealth whioh results from the market system and 
from the transmission of property rights through inheritance.
6. The market system, especially in a highly developed financial 
economy, does not neoessarily bring high employment, price
32
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level stability, and the socially desired rate of economic 
growth, Public policy is needed to secure these objectives
7. Public and private points of view on the rate of discount 
used in valuation of future (relative to present) consumption 
may differ,*5
Before one discusses the proper role, if any, of the state, it is first 
necessary to define the state. Public finance economists hove similar 
definitions of the state, but all differ radically from that held by Austrians. 
The 19th century German sociologist Franz Oppenheimer sums the Austrian 
position when he writes: "There are two fundamentally opposed means 
whereby man, requiring sustenance, is impelled to obtain the necessary 
means for satisfying his desires. These are work and robbery, one's own 
labor and the forcible appropriation of the labor of others...I propose in the 
following discussion to call one's own labor...the 'economic means'...while 
the unrequited appropriation of the labor of others will be called the 
'political means.'"66
This is in stark contrast to Due and Friedlaender who write: "society 
organizes collectively through government for two purposes: to ensure that 
the market-determined allocation of goods and services is efficient and to 
enable society to reach its preferred point on the utility possibility frontier."67 
It is difficult to imagine how a government based on coercion could bring 
any society to its preferred point on the utility possibility frontier. Every 
government action, by definition, must bring about a loss in utility. One 
wonders how rulers justified their existence before the advent of the 
modern economist.
That the state is a criminal organization, a creator of monopolies and 
a parasite, does not enter their analyses. Rothbard's analysis cuts through 
the smoke and mirrors:
The State may therefore be defined as the organization which 
possesses either or both (in actual fact, almost always both) of 
the following characteristics: (a) it acquires its revenue by 
physical coercion (taxation); and (b) it achieves a compulsory 
monopoly of foroe and of ultimate decision-making power
65Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice, pp. 5-6. 
66Qppenheimer, The Sfafe, p. 12.
67Due and Friedlaender, Government Finance, p. 120
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over a given territorial area. Botti of these essential activities 
of the State necessarily constitute criminal aggression and 
depredation of the just rights of private property of Its subjects 
(including self-ownership). For the first constitutes and 
establishes theft on a grand scale; while the second prohibits 
the free com petition of defense and decision-making 
agencies within a given territorial a rea -p roh ib iting  the 
voluntary purchase and sale of defense and judicial services,*^
Shoup's analysis blurs the distinction between the state, church and 
family when he writes: "The government's system operates with the aid of a 
legal power of compulsion. But in many countries one or more members of 
a family or of a religious or charitable organization have possessed or still 
do possess legal power of compulsion over other members. The chief 
difference between the government's allocating system and that of the 
family, church, or other nonprofit institution lies in the degree of 
impersonality of the rules under which the government distributes its 
services and allocates the burden of covering the costs."69 On the same 
page he continues: "In its use of impersonal rules the government 
resembles the market more than it does the family or nonprofit institution."
It seems Shoup is attempting to gloss over the use of non-defensive 
coercion, a true differenoe between the market and the state. Charities 
do not resort to coercion if their benefactors or prospective benefactors 
refuse to contribute because they are voluntary organizations. 
Government isn't. No one goes to jail for not supporting a charity. It is true 
that families do exert a degree of coercion over their offspring but this 
cannot be said about adults.70 They are free to do as they will. The 
authority of the family ends when one becomes an adult. The authority of 
government never ends.
Boadway and Wildasin hold the "we are the government" view of the 
state. They write: "The state is viewed as the sum total of the individuals in 
society rather than as being an entity unto itself with its own goals and 
desires. As a consequence, the criterion by which we judge government 
decision-making is the same as that by which we judge market decision-
68Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, p. 171.
69Shoup, Pubiic Finance, p. 4.
7°This coercion can be avoided by running away or becom ing an 
emancioated minor.
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making; that is, by how well it accords with the preferences of individuals in 
sooiety."7i But we are not the state,72 The state consists of a minority of 
individuals and their decisions reflect only fhe/T preferences.
Furthermore, all government decisions rest on coercion. Coercive 
actions are seldom in accord with the voluntary preferences of individuals 
outside the state. If they were, no coercion would be required. By their 
criterion, a ll state decision-making must fall short of free-market 
alternatives.
Public finance theories of the state are naive and inadequate. 
Rothbard's view, which incorporates Oppenheimer's anaiysis, is a much 
more accurate description of the nature and operation of the state and is 
the one that will be used throughout this paper.
Cost-B enefit Analysis
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is another tool of the publio finance 
economist. Those projects tha t yield benefits greater than costs are 
considered efficient and therefore suitable for the undertaking. CBA 
usually involves the ranking of alternative projects.
Hyman summarizes the process of CBA as follows:
1. Enumerate all costs and benefits of the proposed project.
2. Evaluate all costs and benefits in dollar terms.
3. Discount future benefits ...73
The subjectivity of costs and benefits stands in the way of successfully 
com pleting step 1. Some benefits may seem easy to enumerate. For 
example, a new transit system provides an additional and perhaps more 
convenient m ethod of transport. But whether this is a benefit depends 
upon the valuations of the taxpayers. Again, since taxation is used to 
finance state projects, the question of whether one can be said to benefit 
from coerced actions complicates the matter. Absent voluntary choice.
71 Boadway and Wildasin, Public Sector Economics, p. 56.
72According to this view, every action of the state, no matter how evil, is 
the will of the everyone, even the victims.
73Hyman, Public Finance, p. 301.
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an economist cannot determine whettier a proposed project provides 
benefits to anyone. Further, even if taxation were absent from the 
equation, the economist would have to rely on voluntary contributions or 
wait until the project was finished and then present the choice to the 
individual. Until this occurred, an economist could make no scientific 
pronouncement on the existence of benefits.
Similar problems exist for the pinpointing of costs. That same transit 
system may require eminent domain or taxes for land acquisition and 
construction. This seems like an obvious cost, but costs hove no meaning 
apart from the individuals who realize them. What is the opportunity cost to 
an individual of having his property confiscated? Or of having five dollars in 
taxes extracted from him? A hot dog? A pencil? A com pact disc? What 
about nontangible subjective elements?
The same roadblock stands in the way of completing step 2. CBA is 
predicated on the assumption that "a dollar is judged to hove the same 
value no matter to whom it a c c r u e s . " ^ / )  This assumption is almost given no 
consideration yet all cost-benefit conclusions spring from it. It is a 
m omentary suspension of logic. The value one places on anything is 
subjective. The fact that value is intensive rather than extensive in space is 
the biggest roadblock in the way of the economist who wishes to moke 
such blanket statements.
One fault of this assumption lies in the neoclassical view that the 
closer markets are to perfect com petition the closer money costs will 
equal opportun ity  costs.75 The perfect com petition  paradigm  is 
unmitigated nonsense. Money cannot measure costs, neither can money 
costs and opportunity costs be equalized. As has been illustrated, when 
one engages in exchange, the money given up is valued less than the item 
received. This is all we can glean from the a c t of exchange. Opportunity 
costs are entirely subjective and cannot be known to any outside observer. 
The ephemeral and subjective nature of these costs prevents them from 
being aggregated in any meaningful scientific sense.
Step 3 also presents problems. Future benefits are discounted by the 
social rate of discount. This is necessary because of the universal fact of
74Boadway and Wildasin, Public Sector Economics, p. 190. 
75Formaini, The Myth of Scientific Public Policy, p. 47.
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time preference: Future benefits cannot have the same value as those 
some benefits in the present. But if CBA foils steps 1 and 2 is there any 
reason to consider the discounting of future "benefits"?
Atkinson and Stiglitz see the problems of CBA in another light. They 
write: "[T]he problem of cost-benefit analysis is simply whether we can find 
reasonable short cuts. In particular, we are presumed to have good  
information concerning direct costs and benefits of a  project (its inputs and 
outputs); the question is whether there is any simple way of relating the total 
effects (the total changes in the vectors of consumption) to the direct 
effects. (Italics a d d e d . )"76
This is an unreasonable presumption. These "direot costs and 
benefits" are entirely subjective. All we know is tha t if an individual 
exchanges a sum of money for a good then he values the good more than 
the money he gives up. Nothing more.
The only method of determining whether social benefits outweigh 
social costs is through the voluntary interactions of the market. Sinoe all 
acts of government intervention occur outside the social nexus o f 
voluntary exchange, they must, by definition, be utility-reducing. Any 
attempt by economists to measure the benefioial effects of government is 
futile and necessarily non-scientific.
Even if CBA was valid it would still not follow the project in question 
should be undertaken. This requires a moral judgment derived outside the 
field of economics.
76,Atkinson and Stiglitz, Lectures on Public Finance, p. 475.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
38
G overnm ent D e b t
Government debt finances deficits, transfer payments and projects. 
Ttiis debt differs from private debt in that the funds used to repay the debt 
are acquired by way of taxation or c o u n t e r f e i t i n g . 77 i t  also makes for a 
more stable form of debt for investors because the state can never go 
bankrupt. It can always print money or increase taxes to cover its debt 
obligations.78
Not all economists agree on the effects government debt. Atkinson 
and Stiglitz write: "Whether the existence of government debt diverts 
savings and leads to a reduction in real capital accumulation depends, for 
example, on whether people take a long-term view of the liabilities of 
succeeding generations and adjust bequest behavior."79
On the contrary, praxeology tells us that government debt must 
always lead to a reduction in real capital accumulation. The mere act of 
government spending reduces real capita l accumulation because it is 
pure consumption. The defining characteristic of investment is that the 
capital is spent to satisfy the wishes of consumers. Government spending 
satisfies the wishes of government agents. It is not investment.8°
Further, in a monetary economy investment is characterized by an 
expenditure on intermediate products to produce a good from which 
revenue is expected to pay for the outlay and a return on the investment. 
For most coercive sector investments, no revenue is ever collected. When
77Counterfeiting, as used throughout this paper, refers to the creation of 
money out of thin air, Austrians maintain that money originated out of 
barter as a commodity. Therefore, every exchange involved the giving up 
of a commodity for a good or service. Non-backed paper money is not a 
market phenomenon. Rather, it is the result of state intervention. The state, 
instead of mining for gold money, creates money out of thin air. Only the 
state and private counterfeiters can obtain goods and services with 
money created out of thin air. Everyone else must produce a good or 
service in exchange for money. (See Menger, Principles of Economicsand 
Rothbard, What Has Government Done to Our Money?)
78The option of printing money applies only to the central government.
79Atkinson and Stiglitz, Lectures on Public Finance, p. 257.
80Rothbard, Power and Market, p. 173.
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no revenue is oollected, the expenditure is pure consumption, n o t 
investment,81
The funds to repay state de b t must com e from savings or 
counterfeiting. Repayment with private savings negatively impacts capitai 
accumulation. The act of saving, like all actions, has costs. These savings 
are not paid to the state voluntarily but are expropriated by way of 
taxation. This necessarily reduces the incomes of taxpayers. Time 
preferences are negatively affected as every tax or tax increase pushes 
individuals closer to subsistence. Those nearer subsistence cannot save as 
much, as present concerns (namely surviving) will tend to outweigh future 
ones. A higher social time preference means lower savings and cap ita l 
accumulation, which in turn translate into a lower standard of living.
In addition, man must not always work. Leisure is always an 
alternative. As the cost of work increases through taxation, the relative 
cost of leisure is reduced. Accordingly, more individuals will engage in 
leisure instead of work, further reducing the supply of capita l as the less 
productive have less to save.
Repayment by counterfeiting results in inflation and the concomitant 
systematic wealth redistribution from non-counterfeiters to counterfeiters 
and the early receivers of the counterfeit money. This method is chosen 
less frequently than taxation as its effects are exacerbated by fractional- 
reserve banking. Under the current system, any counterfeit paper money 
increases the money supply by ten times the amount of the paper inflation.
Government debt also crowds out private investment. The state's 
demand for funds increases the demand for savings and must com pete 
with private interests. This increases the interest rate above what it would 
be without the state competing for funds.
On the nature of government debt Hyman writes:
Debt financing implies the sale of a security that bears the 
promise to pay interest over a given number of years and to 
return the principal loaned at the end of the given time period.
There is no compulsion involved in the saies of such securities. 
Instead governments com pete with other borrowers in the
81 If a price is charged for the coercive sector product one must wonder 
why the free market had not provided such a service. The answer is most 
likely that the investment project was not viable.
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market for loanable funds. The government pays the going 
market rate of interest, adjusted for risk and maturity 
characteristics of the obligation it issues. Thus, the issuance of 
government debt is similar to the sale of services that have the 
regular characteristics of private goods. Government sells 
securities of various types...that compete with various private
securities...82
The above leads one believe that the sale of government debt is no 
different from the sale of private debt. Government debt is debt in name 
only, In actuality, it is an extortion contract. In exchange for the 
purchaser's funds the state agrees to pay the principal and interest not with 
its own resources, but with the resources of a non-contractual third party, 
taxpayers. Were these bonds sold by a private person, he would be 
quickly jailed. But since the state sets the ruies of the game, it naturally 
exempts itself from prosecution.
Debt requires two parties, a debtor and a creditor. In the cose of 
government debt, the creditors are those individuals who seek a secure 
investment a t the expense of others.88 And the debtors ore those 
politicians and bureaucrats who oversaw the issuance of that debt, Any 
attem pt to collect from individuals outside this group is tantamount to 
extortion,
The enforcing of government obligations, like taxation, has profound 
sociological effects, By doing so, it increases the costs of homesteading, 
contracting and producing while reducing the costs of non-homesteading, 
non-contracting and non-producing. Accordingly, more individuals will 
tend to engage in the latter activities, whereas prior to their legalization 
these invasive actions were primarily the domain of criminals.
Opinions differ on the nature of the burdens associated with state 
debt. Due and Friedlaender admit that government expenditures burden 
voluntary sector output. They write: "The burden is, of course, more than
82|-iyman, Public Finance, p. 445.
88It can be argued that bondholders are also taxpayers. This much is true. 
But we can also conclude that bondholders plan on receiving more than 
the amount they pay for government debt otherwise there would be little 
reason to purchase these bonds, unless of oourse it was to provide the 
state with a gift. It must be remembered that not everyone is a bondholder 
to the same extent, but everyone is a taxpayer. This situation implies 
systematic redistribution.
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offset by the gains fronn the governmental programs if the latter are 
established on the basis of the preferences of the community, with a net 
gain from the activity as a w h o l e . "84 This statement is difficult to justify if one 
realizes that the power of all governments rest on coercion and coercive 
actions seldom represent the preferences of those coerced. Since 
coercion is involved in financing all government programs, Pareto 
superiority cannot be fulfilled as not all parties to the financing (namely the 
coerced) con be said to benefit.
From the viewpoint of praxeology, government debt is a double 
burden on the economy. First, resources are diverted from the productive 
voluntary sector to the unproductive coercive sector. Second, the debt 
incurred must be paid out at some time in the future with taxes or 
counterfeit m o n e y . 8 5
The proper role of the economist is not to advocate  or defend 
government debt, but to point out the negative im pact of such debt. All 
state debt is by its very nature a predation. The solution, usually only 
reserved for third-world nations, is to repudiate all government debt.86
What of the fa te of government bondholders? They will incur 
entrepreneurial losses just as those in the voluntary sector who make 
incorreot forecasting judgments. There is no reason to give these
84Que and Friedlaender, Government Finance, p. 219.
85Rothbard, Man, Economy and State, p. 942(137).
86Debt repudiation is not an exclusively non-American experience. 
Rothbard writes; "Although largely forgotten by historians and the public, 
repudiation of state debt is a solid part of the American tradition. The first 
wave of repudiation of state debt came during the 1840's, after the panics 
of 1837 and 1839. Those panics were the consequence of a massive 
inflationary boom fueled by the Whig-run Seoond Bank of the United States. 
Riding the wave of inflationary credit, numerous state governments, largely 
those run by the Whigs floated an enormous amount of debt, most of 
which went into wasteful public works (euphemistically called 'internal 
improvements'), and into the creation of inflationary banks...The next great 
wave of state deb t repudiation came in the South after the blight of 
Northern occupation and Reconstruction had been lifted from them. Eight 
Southern states (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia) proceeded, during the late 1870's 
and early 1880's under Democratic regimes, to repudiate the debt foisted 
upon their taxpayers by the corrupt and wasteful carpetbag Radical 
Republican governments under Reconstruction." (Rothbard, "Repudiating 
the National Debt," p.52.)
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bondholders any preferential treatnnent, especially since they wished 
(either consciously or unconsciously) to make a safe "investment" at the 
expense of others, if these bondholders wish to collect, the only individuals 
who could possibly be responsible for redeeming the bonds are the 
politicians and bureaucrats that oversaw their issuance.
The repudiation of public debts is in accord with private property 
rights. This cannot be said with regard to private debts. On the difference 
Rothbard writes:
If I borrow money from a m ortgage bank, I have m ade a 
contract to transfer my money to a creditor at a future date; in 
a deep sense, he is the true owner of the money at that point, 
and if I don't pay I am robbing him of his just property. But 
when government borrows money, it does not pledge its own 
money; its own resources ore not liable. Government commits 
not its own life, fortune, and sacred honor to repay the debt, 
but ours. This is a horse, and a transaction, of a very different 
coior.87
Repudiation will, no doubt, face much resistance as many in our 
society have a vested interest in the smooth functioning of the predatory 
state apparatus. One beneficial aspect of repudiation is no one will wont 
to purchase government bonds knowing full well that at some time in the 
future they may be repudiated. This will make it particularly difficult for the 
state to procure financing.
Econom ic Stabilization
Economic stabilization is another ground for g o v e rn m e n t 
intervention. Inflation, business cycles and unemployment, public finance 
authors assert, require government intervention. Actually, they result from 
intervention.
Inflation results from an increase in the demand for, or a decrease in 
the supply of, goods and services. Since the supply of goods and services 
isn't shrinking, it must com e from the demand side. But an Individual's
87Rothbard, "Repudiating the Nationai Debt," p. o2.
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increase in demand for one good, ceteris paribus, must result in ttie 
decrease in demand for ottiers. Government counterfeiting is necessary 
for overall prices to rise.
The counterfeit money can be channeled into the economy either 
through the credit system or transfer payments, As individuals receive the 
new money, their dem and for goods and services increases. The 
recipients of this money repeat the sequence. Prices don't rise at the 
same time and to the same extent throughout the economy. Instead, a 
multitude of rippling effects occur throughout the economy depending 
upon the locations and purchases of the recipients.
Inflation redistributes goods and services in favor of the early 
recipients of the counterfeit money, e.g., politicians, bureaucrats, 
government contractors, as their purchases are m ade before the full 
effect of the inflation is felt. Individuals on fixed incomes and those that 
never see the new money are hit the hardest.
In addition, the real value of savings declines as all goods and 
services now cost more. A dollar will no longer purchase what It once 
could. This discourages savings because every dollar that remains unspent 
will diminish in value from year to year under inflation. Inflation also creates 
capital consumption, as some producers will not realize that their increased 
profits are not profits at all, but merely Inflationary gains required to replace 
their capital g o o d s . ^ s
Money flowing into the credit system produces all the above effects 
in addition to creating a business cycle. As the money flows into the credit 
markets, it lowers the interest rate. Investment projects previously 
nonvioble at the higher interest rate, namely those in the higher orders of 
production, ore now profitable at the lower interest rate.89,9o
The firms that receive the new money bid up the prices of labor and 
land required for the projects in the higher orders. In turn, the employees of 
these firms use the money to purchase goods and services a t their
®®See Rothbard, Wt)ot has Government Done to our Money?
®9The funds will also be lent for projects that are not in the higher orders, but 
the major impact is on the higher orders.
90|t may happen that interest doesn't seem to be lower than before. But so 
long as the money is channeled into the credit system the rate will be lower 
than what it would have been without the counterfeit credit.
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unchanged consumption-investment ratios. This creates upward pressure 
on interest rates, as a reduction in the social rate of time preference has 
not changed to reflect the lower time-preference required to maintain the 
lower interest rate.
As time passes, factors are bid away from the higher orders into the 
lower orders reflecting the unchanged social time-preference. Firms in the 
higher orders will find their resource prices rising above their initial forecasts 
because of new com petition from firms in the lower orders. Unless the 
government pumps more money into the credit system, they will be forced 
to liquidate.
The process will continue until the point is reached where the 
governm ent can no longer increase the supply of credit without also 
tacking on an inflation premium. When the flow of new fiduciary credit is 
stopped, a bust (recession) will f o l l o w . ^ !
Full Employment
Full employment is an assumption underlying public finance analysis. 
It exists when everyone willing to work a t the market rate for his type of 
labor has a job. It excludes frictional employment. Under full employment 
neither structural unemployment nor unemployment due to a deficiency in 
aggregate demand exists.
Without full employment it is alleged that orthodox theories do not 
hold true. Therefore, the coercive sector must intervene to remedy any 
deviation from full employment. Rothbard maintains the opposite:
[l]t should be emphasized that econom ic theory does not 
"assume" full employment. Economics, in fact, "assumes" 
nothing. The whole discussion of alleged "assumptions" reflects 
the bias of the epistemology of physics, where "assumptions" 
are m ade without originally knowing their validity and ore 
eventually tested to  see whether or not their consequents are 
correct. The economist does not "assume"; he know s . Fie 
concludes on the basis of logical deduction from self-evident
9''For a more complete explanation, see Rothbard, America's Great
Depression.
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axioms, i.e., axioms that are either logically or empirically
incontrovertible.92
Casting the full em ploym ent assumption aside, there is no 
employment problem in a free-market society. Everyone, os long os he is 
willing to work, con find work. There is an infinite amount of work to  be 
done. As long as their is scarcity, there will be work.
Mainstream economists give the impression that work, any work, is 
what is important. If this were true, people would work for free or even pay 
employers to let them w o r k .9 3  what Is sought by most is work at a wage 
above subsistence level.
The price of labor, like every other good in the market, is determined 
by supply and demand. The pricing system conspicuously falls out of full 
employment analysis. This is the hallmark of crackpot economics.
A distinction between voluntary and involuntary unemployment must 
be made. Voluntary unemployment can occur whenever a laborer 
prefers to engage in leisure instead of employment. This is the choice of 
the individual. It can also occur when an Individual Is holding out for a 
wage that exceeds his discounted marginal value product (DMVP). For 
example, he wants to receive $15 an hour, yet the market only values the 
fruits of his labor at $5 an hour. A similar result occurs If on Individual is 
holding out for a specific job but is not hired for the position.
Involuntary unemployment can only result from governm ent 
intervention. If the state mandates a minimum wage of $10 an hour, then 
only those individuals with a DMVP of $ 10 or higher will find a job. All others 
must remain unemployed.
Some economists, like Keynes, con tend  th a t invo luntary 
unemployment can occur on the free market. But employment is a two- 
party affair. Both parties must agree to the terms of employment. If an 
individual cannot find employment, it is because he cannot come to terms 
with an employer.
Hoppe points out that if someone can be labeled Involuntarily 
unemployed on the free market, individuals can also be called involuntarily 
Mercedes-less or wife-less. One remains Mercedes-less if he cannot come
92Rothbard, Man Economy and State, pp. 523-523. 
93This will never occur because of the disutility of labor.
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to terms witti a Mercedes dealer, For example, I would like a Mercedes for 
$5,000, but as long as no dealer will sell me one for this price, can I be 
called involuntarily Mercedes-less? Of course not, this would turn logic on 
its head. It implies that coercion is necessary to make one or both of the 
parties com e to on agreement. To do so would redefine coercive to 
mean voluntary and voluntary to mean c o e r c iv e . 9 4
Wage rigidity is considered a market phenomenon. In fact, it is the 
result of the minimum wage and government privileges accorded to 
unions. Unions prevent wages from moving downward by using coercion 
to prohibit non-members from entering their markets, thereby lowering the 
wage. Those prohibited from entering a unionized occupation are forced 
to seek less remunerative employment.95
Some counter that finding a job takes time and advertising, But this is 
true of every good and service on the free market. Humans lack perfect 
Information and consequently are not aware of all possible opportunities, 
Employment agencies and classified ads can facilitate employment,
The supply of capital determines how high wages can increase. In 
some countries or regions of a country the supply of capital may not be 
great enough to guarantee everyone above subsistence level wages. This 
is not a deficiency of the market. It Is the result of the voluntary actions of 
individuals. It may also happen that an individual lacks the skills or talent 
required to find employment above subsistence level. These Individuals 
must rely on charity for their livelihood.%
94Roppe, "Theory of Employment, Money, Interest and the Capitalist 
Process," p. 113, fn. 7.
95Every individual seeks to maximize his income, both psychic and 
monetary, while selecting a job or career. The fact that a union backed by 
state-supported coercion can prevent him from entering his desired 
occupation tells us that he must forego his most-valued option and select 
the next highest option.
96Rothbard, Man Economy and State, pp. 522-528
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Econom ie G row th
Economie growth refers to the increase in a country's per capita 
national income. Shoup writes:
The rate at which Income per head will grow under full 
employment can be increased by public finance measures 
tha t restrain certain types of consumption, thus freeing 
resources for investment in the broadest sense. Including 
education, medical care, and Improvements in the pattern 
and level of nutrition for children and working-age adults that 
increase their productive capacity, present or future, by more 
than the cost of these improvements (all discounted to a given 
date). Some of those whose consumption is restricted for this 
purpose win object, not agreeing that the present sacrifice is 
worth the gain, present and  future, even if tha t gain 
materializes in time to be enjoyed by them rather than only by 
a future generation. No consensus can be reached on the 
rate o f growth to be achieved by governm ent action. 
(emphasis added)
While the rate of growth achieved without intervention may be 
considered non-optimal, no reason is given. The rate of economic growth 
in any society is determined by the time preferences of the individuals in 
that society. In this sense a consensus has been reached. Government 
action, by definition, involves the use of coercion and thus must supplant 
some choices while allowing others.
What is wrong if individuals would rather no t spend their money 
according to the wishes of those in power? Some may agree that any 
"sacrifice" is worth the gain, but only Individuals can determine whether any 
alleged gain is a gain to them individually. For an economist to determine 
what is a gain and whether that gain exceeds the sacrifice would Imply the 
interpersonal comparison of utilities, clearly violating the bounds of value- 
free economics.
Moreover, the conclusion that government intervention should make 
up the alleged growth deficit does not follow. This requires a value
97$houp, Public Finance, pp.38-39.
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judgment. Nor does it follow that such intervention will be fruitful. The 
history of intervention is one of economic retardation.’ ®
Musgrave puts forward a similar point; "Individuals are said to suffer 
from 'myopia,' so that, in arranging their private affairs, they underestimate 
the im portance  of saving and overestim ate th a t of present 
consumption...Hence, the consumers' time discount is too high and 
government should correct this error by applying a lower rate."”  What is 
the proof of this myopia? Who is to say what is too high or too low? Time 
preferences are entirely subjective. Further, even if this were the case, it 
does not follow that government should correct this valuation.
Economic growth results from savings and a legal and tax 
environment not hostile to private property. The voluntary tim e 
preferences of individuals will determ ine the proportion of incom e 
allocated to savings and consumption. Growth results from the channeling 
of savings into investment which. In turn, increases the amount of capital 
per employee. When more capita l is consumed than created, on 
economy will retrogress. If only enough capital is created to replace the 
amount consumed, on economy will not grow. An overall increase will 
result in a progressing economy. All the coercive sector can do to 
improve economic growth is to get out of the way.
The tools used to measure economic growth are questionable. The 
most common statistic Is gross national product or gross domestic product. 
Each of these statistics contains government spending as a contributory 
component of production. We know the prices of such items os guns and 
beer because they are sold on the market. But this is not the case for 
government-provided goods and services. Rather than omitting these
'’®Soviei Union and the formerly East Germany are a couple examples 
(Block, The Justification for Taxation, p. 150.) It seems only mainstream 
economists like Paul Samuelson actually believe government intervention 
can be a force for good. He writes; "The Soviet Economy proves that, 
contrary to what the Soviets themselves may believe, a centrally planned 
can function and even prosper." (Economics, 1989) While Austrians hove 
been writing for decades that this is praxeologically impossible, others 
(Samuelson et ol)have thought otherwise.
” Musgrave, Pubiic Finance in Theory and Practice, p. 181.
’ooBlock, "Public Finance Texts Cannot Justify Government Taxation," p. 257.
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goods and services from the statistics, their production costs are equated 
with the prices of goods that are actually sold on the markets
The assumption underlying these calculations is the mistaken notion 
that costs determine prices, \A/ere this the cose, there would be no 
business losses. But then what value can be given to such outlays? None, 
if no one pays for them voluntarily, then we cannot say with any scientific 
certainty that they have any value whatsoever. Goods and services 
voluntarily purchased on the market are worth more to the consumers than 
the money given up in exchange. But nothing even closely resembling this 
occurs for government-provided goods and services. Therefore, any 
statistic utilizing government outlays as a measure of production or 
economic welfare must be inherently flawed.
Moreover, GDP cannot account for changes in quality or new 
products. For most individuals what Is Important is not the amount of 
income they receive, but what can be purchased with this income.
M erit G oods
Another basis for government intervention is the merit good. While 
the absence of perfect com petition misallocates resources, some 
economists contend the same conditions bring about circumstances 
wherein goods are not misallocated, but a llocated according to the 
principles of consumer sovereignty. Oddly enough, g o ve rn m e n t 
intervention is advocated precisely because the market is meeting the 
demands of consumers, Some of these demands should be encouraged 
and others discouraged.
Musgrave writes: "While consumer sovereignty is the general rule, 
situations may arise, within the context of a democratic community, where 
an in fo rm ed  group is justified in imposing its decision on others...The 
advantages of education are more evident to the informed than the 
uninformed, thus justifying compulsion in the allocation of resources to 
education...the freedom to belong may override the freedom to exclude.
10’ See Rockwell, "The Fraud of GNP."
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and so forth."i° 2  While it may be true the advantages of education are 
more evident to the informed, it does not follow that compulsion is justified, 
In fact, this is true for almost all goods on the market. The advantages of 
wine, guns and classical music are more evident to the informed. Should 
these also be subsidized? The list is infinite.’ os The use of compulsion is an 
ethical decision that does not follow from mere statements of fact.
Moreover, what are the limits on informed groups to impose their 
decisions on others? Musgrave writes: "Interferences with consumer 
choice may occur simply because a ruling group considers its particular set 
of mores superior and wishes to impose it on others. Such determination of 
wonts rests on an authoritarian basis, not permissible in our normative 
model based upon a democratic society."’ But don't all groups wishing to 
impose their mores on others implicitly believe their values are superior to 
those of the non-conformists? Why else would they want to force them on 
others?
In addition, the label "merit goods" is a violation of va lue-free 
economics. Economics tells us whether a good is on object of human 
desire. If it is sought after, it will have a price. To say that a good Is 
meritorious requires that the economist impute a value judgment onto that 
good.’ 05
Public G oods
Most economists ad vo ca te  governm ent intervention in the 
econom y for the provision of public goods. Presumably, without 
government intervention these goods will not be sufficiently produced or 
produced at all. This notion Is particularly striking because public goods -  
police protection, roads and national defense -  are key to the functioning 
of a civilized society.
’ 02Musgrave, The Theory o f Public Finance, p. 14.
’ o^Block, "Public finance texts cannot justify government taxation," p. 247.
’ 04 Musgrave, The Theory of Pubiic Finance, p. 14.
’ o^categorizing objects into goods and bads also constitutes a value 
judgment.
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While there are many definitions of public goods, there are two 
characteristics most economists can agree upon: public goods are 
nonrivalrous in consumption and nonexcludable.
A nonrivalrous good is one which is not diminshed by use, like national 
defense. An additional inhabitant doesn't reduce the amount of defense 
left over for others in the country.
It is impossible (or prohibitively costly) to keep the benefits of 
nonexcludable goods from others. For example, if I spray my house with 
cockroach poison and exterminate every cockroach, my neighbors 
invariably benefit, because no cockroaches will leave my property and 
invade theirs.
One result of nonexcludable goods is the presence of the free rider, 
one who benefits from another's production while not compensating the 
producer. This is a positive externality, a benefit that cannot be fully 
captured by either the producer or owner. Free riders are the chief reason 
public goods will be underproduced or not produced at all if left to the free 
market.
There are also negative externalities.’ These occur when the cost 
of an action is not solely borne by the actor. Instead, others must also bear 
some of the cost. A common example of this is p o llu t io n .T h e  polluter 
does not bear the full cost of his polluting activities since others will breathe 
the air or drink the water that has been polluted. Negative externalities 
increase the production of a good beyond that which would be socially 
optimal. As with positive externalities, governm ent intervention is 
advocated to remedy this situation.
Externalities exist for virtually every good.’®® Planting flowers in one's 
front yard has externalities. Some may consider them an improvement to 
the street, others may consider them a detriment. The same with women's
’ 0®A distinction should be made between externalities that uninvitedly 
violate the physical integrity of one's person or property and those that do 
no such thing. Uninvited physical-integrity violations are invasions. Non- 
invasive externalities are subjective, and their nature can change with the 
changing of individuals' minds. The following discussion deals with non- 
invasive externalities.
’ ®70n the difference between invasive and non-invasive pollution, see 
Rothbard, "Law, Property Rights, and Air Pollution."
’ 0®Block, "Pubiic Goods and Externaiities," p. 2.
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makeup, designer clothes and perfume, Externalities exist in the eyes of the 
beholder. The externality may be positive, negative or not even concern 
an individual.
Mainstream economists are inconsistent in their application of the 
externalities argument. If externalities call for government intervention, 
then government intervention must not only stop at police provision, 
national defense and roads, but must extend to the entire economy as all 
actions have externalities. To apply the criterion to only a few areas is 
illogical and defeats the purpose of having any such criterion.’ ”
Musgrave falls victim to this criticism when he argues that "a sanitary 
cam paign that raises the general level of health throughout an area" 
accrues benefits to everyone, consequently "[gjovernment must step in, 
and compulsion is called for."” ® But is compulsion called for in providing 
housing, food and clothing? No. If all have similar effects on the 
surrounding community, shouldn't they also be provided by the state? 
Musgrave refuses to carry his argument to its logical conclusion.
Boadway and Wildasin are guilty of faulty reasoning. "The existence 
of pure public goods, or goods simultaneously consumed by all individuals 
in a given population (local, regional, national, world) provides perhaps the 
strongest case for public sector intervention."” ’ But this is nothing more 
than a mere statement of fact. To conclude, as they do, that coercion 
can follow from a statement of fact is tantamount to making the statement 
that bums exist, and thus there should be government aid. The bums may 
well deserve aid, but it does not follow that coercion is justified. For this to 
follow one would have to introduce a norm into his chain of reasoning.
Not only do externalities exist for every action but Rothbard also 
points out that everyone is a free rider:
The difficulty with this argument is that it proves far too much.
For which one of us would earn anything like our present real 
income were it not for external benefits that we derive from 
the actions of others? Specifically, the great m o d e rn  
accumulation of capital goods is an inheritance from all the 
net savings of our ancestors. Without them, we would,
’ ” lbid., p. 6.
” ®Musgrave, Theory of Public Finance, pp. 9-10. 
’ ’ ’ Boadway and Wildasin, Public Sector Economics, p. 57.
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regardless of the quality of our own moral character, be living 
in a primitive jungle. The inheritance of money capital from our 
ancestors is, of course, simply inheritance in this c a p ita l 
structure. We are also free riders on the present, because we 
benefit from the continuing investment of our fellow men and 
from their specialized skills on the market. Certainly the vast 
bulk or our wages, if they could be so imputed, would be due 
to this heritage on which we are free riders. The landowner 
has no more of an unearned increment tha t any one of us.
Are all of us to suffer confiscation, therefore, and to be taxed 
for our happiness? And who then is to receive the loot? Our 
dead ancestors who were our benefactors investing the
capital?” ^
In the absence of any sort of contract, can someone who benefits 
from a so-called public good be obliged to pay for it? Block gives the 
example of miniskirts, an unusual although completely analogous case.” ® 
An attractive woman in a miniskirt provides external benefits in the form of 
viewing pleasure to passers-by. Should she be given the right to extract 
monetary compensation from all those benefltting from her beauty? A 
society that accepted  the free-rider argument and its logical Implications 
would quickly degenerate into chaos as it would allow the enforcement of 
one-party contracts.” 4
A free rider is one who receives the benefits of a good or service but 
knows he can benefit from others actions If he does not pay for these 
goods and services. But it is impossible and illogical to conclude that 
because someone does not purchase a public good tha t he actually 
wants it. This assertion oversteps the bounds of value-free science and 
implies the existence of some superhuman ability to read the minds of 
others. ” 5
It is not always true that some public goods have externalities that 
are impossible to capture or internalize. In the case of roods, public goods 
advocates maintain it is Impossible for the private provider to prevent 
benefits from spilling over to neighboring properties. But this presents only 
a minor obstacle, for developers can, before anyone Is aware of their 
plans, purchase all the neighboring property secretly before construction
” 2Rothbard, Man Economy and State , pp 888-889. 
” ®Block, "Public Goods and Externalities," pp. 10-11. 
” 4|bid., p. 11.
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of the road, thus making a gain possible.” ® Even if it is impossible to 
purchase land along the planned route, the developer can alvvrays change 
the direction of the rood, tunnel or p lace a bridge over the planned 
route.’ ”
This is also true of police protection. Police protection does not exist 
in the abstract, rather it consists of specific services provided to specific 
individuals and areas. Police do not have to patrol or provide services to 
everyone in their area. If roads were privately owned, the owners could 
incorporate police protection in the tolls. Many owners of apartment 
complexes provide police protection, as do many firms. The situation can 
be the same with national defense. Rothbard notes:
But "national defense" is surely not an absolute good with only 
one unit of supply. It consists of specific resources committed 
in certain definite and concrete ways-and these resources 
are necessarily scarce. A ring of defense bases around New 
York, for example, cuts down the amount possibly available 
around San Francisco.” ®
Another Austrian contention Is that even though the free market may 
result In the underinvestment of a public good. It does not follow that 
government should intervene to make up the deficit. Government 
intervention is a moral conclusion that can only be brought about through 
ethical arguments in one's premises, and since economics is a science of 
means, not ends, such a contention necessarily violates the value-free 
nature of economics.’ ”
Although some contend that the government provision of a public 
good will make up any privately-produced deficit, this Is not so clear. For 
once government has stepped into the arena, it may discourage private 
investment and society will be worse off than before.’2®
On the other hand, it is quite possible that government, absent from 
the profit motive, may over-invest and thus create an altogether new
” ®lbld., p. 8
’ ’ ^Block, "Free Market Transportation," p. 218. 
” ®Rothbard, Man Economy and State, p. 885. 
’ ’ ’’ Block, "Public Goods and Externalities," p. 3.
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misallocation.” ! Witness ttie great numbers of government roads ttia t are 
infrequently traveled and lead to nowhere, a clear misallocation of 
resources. Absent the profit/loss test of the free market, the government 
officials tha t run these projects have no incentive to structure them 
according to the wishes of voluntarily paying customers.
If, as mainstream economists assert, consumers believed a public 
good deficit existed, nothing prevents them from voluntarily financing the 
investors that produce the good in question, The fact that this never 
happens tells us consumers would rather spend their money elsewhere and 
that they value non-public goods more than public goods.” 2 Any 
coercive financing Is bound to result in wasted resources and the provision 
of goods of less than primary importance.’ 23
Even If such a deficit is closed, it is not possible to say what the state 
produces is actually what the public desires. The state treats all goods as 
homogeneous. Thus, they provide "police services." Not guards, alarms, 
security fences or door locks. Everyone's desires are treated the same. 
Furthermore, no profit/loss test exists to tell the state whether their services 
are actually valued by anyone.
The belief that market failure is the result of Individual failure to  
register true preferences (that is, people pretend not to value the good 
only to turn around and enjoy its benefits) also collapses under scrutiny. 
How is it that an economist can know the true preferences of others, when 
he doesn't even know all his own preferences? What of impulsive
purchases?’24
So how is it that economists can claim to know that individuals are 
not registering their true preferences? Clearly, apart from human action, it 
impossible to find one's real preferences. On this Mises writes: "[0]ne must 
not forget that that scale of values or wants manifests itself only in the 
reality of action. These scales have no Independent existence apart from 
the actual behavior of individuals. The only source from which our
’2’ Ibid.
’22Rothbard, Man Econonny and State, p. 890. 
’ 23Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, p. 196. 
’ 24Biock, "Public Goods and Externalities," p. 20.
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knowledge concerning these scales is derived is the observation of a 
man's actions."’ 25
Another line of argum ent used to a d vo ca te  governm ent 
intervention is what Block calls the "isolabillty condition." This occurs when 
the benefits of a government-provided good ore so diffused that it is 
impossible to isolate the exact persons benefited.’ 26
If no one Is willing to step forward and pay for the service, how can 
anyone say that there are hordes of beneficiaries? Apart from actual 
human action, such statements are mere conjecture and outside of the 
sphere of scientific e c o n o m i c s . ’ 27
But is there any clear-cut distinction between public goods and 
private goods? Hoppe believes otherwise.
All goods are more or less private or public and can -a n d  
constantly d o -  change with respect to their degrees of 
privateness/publicness with people's changing values and 
evaluations, and with changes in the composition of the  
population. They never fall, once and for all, into either one or 
the other category.’ 28
For example, the color of one's carpet, length of one's hair or type of 
flowers in one's front yard can becom e a public good merely by people 
caring about them. Some may consider these things the bearers of 
negative externalities. Similarly, the moment they no longer core about 
them, they become private goods.
The non-rivalrous com ponent of the public-goods argument is a 
return to the pre-subjectivist era of economics. Hoppe argues:
How could any outside observer determine whether or not the 
adm ittance of on additional free rider at no charge would not 
Indeed lead to a reduction in the enjoyment of a good by 
others?! Clearly, there is no way that he could objectively do 
so. In fact, it might well be that one's enjoyment of a movie or 
driving on the road would be considerably reduced if more 
people were allowed in the theater or on the rood.’2’
’ 25Mises, Human Action, p.95.
’ 26Block, "Public Goods and Externalities," p. 22.
’27|bid.
’ 28Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, pp. 249-250. 
’29|bld.
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One would hove to ask every consumer of the public good whether 
the good was, in fact, a non-rivalrous good. Moreover, how would one 
aggregate different views as to the non-rivalrous nature of the good in 
question? Even If all views concerning the good were the same, it would 
still be subject to change over time. What then?’®®
The assertion, m ade by Musgrave, that without police and legal 
provisions a market would not be sustainable Is mistaken. It is a fallback to 
the "all or nothing" era of pre-subjectivist economics. Every action occurs 
at the margin. No one decides between having police protection or not 
having police protection in tofo. Instead, each actor decides whether he 
will purchase the good or service in question.
Furthermore, the categorization of externalities as positive or 
negative is a violation of the value-free nature of economics. A positive 
externality to one may be negative to another. For example, a left-liberal 
may view roads as producers of negative externalities, because they work 
against the communal spirit of public transportation by allowing private 
transportation. On the other hand, another may consider roads as having 
positive externalities because it lets him go where he might not otherwise 
be able and because the automobile travel it affords saves him time. Any 
attem pt to group externalities as positive or negative is a lapse into the 
fallacious theory of objective value.’®’
The present terminology should be abandoned in tavor of a more 
m eaningful one. The term free rider is meaningless as it applies to 
everyone. A good can change from public to private with the changing 
valuations of individuals. And externalities exist for every action. The only 
externalities that should matter are those that uninvitedly violate the 
physical integrity of one's person or property. The more appropriate term 
for the by-products of these actions is invasion.
Moreover, it should be remembered that the free market is optimal 
according to the voluntary actions of all individuals, not the ethical views of 
economists. Any move away from these voluntary actions must be non- 
optimal by definition.’®2
’®®lbid.
’®’ Block, "PuDlic finance texts cannot justify taxation," p. 238. 
’ ®2Rothbard, Man Econonriy and State, p. 887.
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G o vern m en t Failure
Government is supposed to provide the public with more of a public 
good than would otherwise be supplied on the free market. But does this 
ever happen?
Outside the price system, how does the government know how 
much and what kind of police services to provide? It doesn't. It can't tell 
whether its services meet the demands of the public; there is no profit/loss 
test. Millions of dollars are spent apprehending prostitutes, non-violent drug 
users and traffic violators while murderers, robbers and rapists roam the 
streets. If a private police agency engaged is such activities at the utter 
disregard of its customers' wishes, it would quickly go out of business. Public 
police prosper because you have to pay them regardless of the quality, 
quantity and type of their service.
Police departm ents take most complaints with a grain of salt, 
knowing full well that the complainants cannot take their patronage 
elsewhere. This is com pounded by the fa c t that nothing rem ote ly 
resembling a contract is given to the public concerning police procedures 
and duties or recourse that can be taken if police do not fulfill their duties.
Government has outlawed privately-competing police agencies, yet 
does anyone feel safer because of this? The drastic increase in the 
purchase of firearms, security systems and private patrols suggest 
otherwise. There are more than tw ice as many private police as public 
police in the United States.’®®
Public police are often accused of gross negligence, inefficiency 
and brutality. According to a study performed by the Police Foundation 
and the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice in 1976, 
more than half of on officer's time is spent on conversations with other 
officers, personal errands and sitting parked on side streets.’ ®^
Situations will arise in government provision that would never be 
tolerated on the market. After 40% of Washington, D.C. police cadets
’ ®®Benson, Enterprise of Law, p. 2 
’ 34|bid., p. 134.
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failed the final exam in 1988, it was abolished. Tucker Carlson, a reporter 
for the Wall Street Journal, writes: "All this had a predictable effect on the 
caliber of Washington cops. 'I saw people who were practically illiterate,' 
says Mike Hubbard, a detective who spent five years training recruits, 'I've 
seen people diagnosed as borderline-retarded graduate from the police 
academy.'"” ®
In an age of forced equality everyone is given an equal opportunity. 
Even cadet applicants with youthful criminal pasts aren't prohibited from 
joining the force. Not surprisingly, Carlson notes "Last year, 36 officers were 
Indicted on charges such as dope dealing, sexual assault, murder, sodomy, 
and kidnapping...." The weak are also encouraged to join the force: The 
department does not require strength or endurance tests. It Is unlikely that 
anyone would voluntarily pay for such ineptitude, yet anything is possible 
once payment is severed from service.
What is even more striking is that the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1856 
that government has no duty to protect anyone [South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 
(HOW) 396, 15 L.Ed., 433 (1856)].” ®
The Seventh Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals ruled in 1982:
...there is no constitutional right to be protected by the state 
against being murdered by criminals or madmen. It is 
monstrous if the state fails to protect Its residents against such 
predators but it does not violate the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment or, we suppose, any other provision of 
the Constitution. The Constitution is a  charter o f negative  
liberties: it teiis the state to let people alone; it does not require 
the federal government or the state to provide services, even 
so elem entary a service as m aintaining law and  order. 
[emphasis added]” 7
State and local governments can't even be held liable for failing to 
establish police departments. Personal protection is an individual 
responsibility. Even so, the courts have upheld state and local laws that 
restrict or prevent citizens from owning firearms for personal protection.” ®
” ®Tucker Carlson, Wail Street Journal, 3 November 1993.
” ®D/a/ 911 and Die!, p. 110.
” 7|bid.
” ®While it is true that most localities do not prohibit gun ownership, almost 
all prohibit concealed carry permits or limit them to celebrities or friends of 
politicians and the sheriff.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
60
Take the case of Linda Riss. Terrorized for several months by her ex- 
boyfriend, who hod a criminal record, Ms. RIss repeatedly sought police 
protection. A resident of New York City, she was forbidden to own a 
weapon. When she feared imminent attack, she once again pleaded with 
the authorities for police protection. She was denied. The next day a man 
hired by her ex-boyfriend threw lye In her face, permanently blinding her in 
one eye and scarring her.
Ms. Riss unsuccessfully sued the city of New York for failure to protect 
her. Judge Keating of the Court of Appeals of New York, in dissent, noted:
What makes the city's position particularly d ifficu lt to 
understand is that, in conformity to the dictates of the law,
Linda did not carry any weapon for self-defense. Thus, by a 
rather bitter irony she was required to rely for protection on the 
City of New York, which now denies all responsibility to her [Riss 
V .  City of New York, 293 N.Y. 2d 897 (1968)]” ’
The justice system is p lagued with inefficiency. Courts are 
overcrowded and case resolution can take years. Consequently, there 
has been an astronomical increase in the use of private arbitration services 
for commercial disputes. Arbitration services handle more than 75 percent 
of commercial disputes. Their services cost less In money and time. Private 
arbitrators are usually prominent members of their field, rather than judges. 
Consequently, they are more know ledgeable in their fields, further 
reducing the amount of time required to hear a case.” ®
Prisons are no better than courts. Overcrowding is so rampant that 
the state must release hard-core criminals to make room for the hordes of 
non-violent criminals they legislate into existence every year. Restitution is 
rarely paid. Instead, all fines accrue to the coffers of the state. Adding 
insult to injury, the criminal Is imprisoned at taxpayer expense and is usually 
never asked to pay one cent for his upkeep.
While many cannot foresee the market undertaking the provision of 
security, it was foreseen by the brilliant 19th century Belg ian-born  
economist Gustave de Molinari who outlined the terms of such agreements 
as follows:
” ’ D /a /9 //, p. 110.
’4®Benson, The Enterprise of Law, p. 2
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In order to be able to guarantee the consumers full security for 
their persons and property, and, In case of harm, to give them 
a compensation proportioned to the loss suffered, it would be 
necessary, indeed:
1. That the producer establish certain penalties against 
the offenders of persons and the violators of property, and 
that the consumers agree to submit to these penalties, in case 
they themselves commit offenses;
2. That he impose certain inconveniences on the 
consumers, with the object of facilitating the discovery of the 
authors of offenses;
3. That he regularly gather, in order to cover his costs of 
production as well as an appropriate return for his efforts, a 
certain sum, variable accord ing  to the situation of the 
consumers, the particular occupations they engage in, and 
the extent, value and nature of their properties.
If these terms, necessary for carrying on this industry, are 
agreeab le  to the consumers, a bargain will be struck. 
Otherwise, the consumers will either do without security, or else 
apply to another producer.” !
Historical evidence suggests that law, courts and police protection 
have all been provided in the past without government. Celtic Ireland (until 
the 17th century). West New Guinea (up to this day), England (before the 
Norman Invasion) and medieval Iceland are all cases of the private 
provision of these most essential services.
In c o m e  Redistribution
Income redistribution supposedly makes the outcomes of the free 
market more equitable.’ 42 jo  Austrians, all market exchanges within the 
boundaries of the non-aggression axiom are just. In the free market 
production and distribution are inseparable. Those who homestead, 
produce or attain property through voluntary exchange are the sole 
owners and controllers of their property. No room is left for po litica l
!4i Molinari, The Production o f Security, p. 13. See in particular Rothbard, For 
o New Liberty; Friedman, Machinery o f Freedom; Morris and Linda Tannehill, 
Market for Liberty, and Benson, The Enterprise of Law.
!42what is equitable is a given rather than presented as the conclusion of 
any coherent system of ethics.
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manipulation of any sort, Tfius, government and the subsequent right to 
vote need not exist in a society that affirms private property rights, for the 
masses use these institutions to control property over which they have no 
rightful claim.
Due and Friedlaender mention two types of income redistribution: 
Pareto optimal and ethical. Pareto optimal redistributions make some 
better off while making none worse off, and ethical income redistributions 
cannot make some better off without making others worse off.
There are two theoretical justifications for Pareto optim al income 
redistributions: (1) income redistribution may be a public good; and (2) the 
rich may be interdependent on the econom ic well-being of the poor. 
Income redistribution may be considered a public good if It enters into 
individual utility functions. From the existence of the social welfare function, 
i.e., the consensus of the political process, they argue tha t "individuals' 
welfare is in some sense dependent upon the incom e distribution of 
socie ty..."!”  They conclude governm ent intervention is needed to 
overcome the free-rider problem and ensure society reaches its utility 
possibility frontier.
This analysis fails on several counts. First, no coercive ac t of income 
redistribution can ever be Pareto superior from the mere fa c t tha t 
coercion is involved. Second, utility functions do not exist; the only way an 
economist can determ ine whether an ac t of incom e redistribution 
improves the giver's utility is if the ac t itself Is voluntary. Third, the existence 
of free riders cannot justify intervention.
Similarly, they argue incom e redistribution may be a positive  
externality. This Is the case If the utilities of the rich are interdependent on 
the income levels of the poor. Reasons given for this interdependency 
include avoidance of slums and political instability. That an individual's well­
being is also dependent on his level of income restricts the size of voluntary 
contributions to the poor. To overcome this, the state must step in and 
collect tax dollars from the rich for distribution to the poor. To illustrate, they 
write:
[Sjuppose that there are N rich people and Q poor people in
society. If a rich person voluntarily gives up one dollar to be
!” Due, Government Finance, p. 121.
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equally divided among the poor, each poor person receives 
7/Q^^of a dollar. If all rich people give up on dollar collectively 
through the government, each poor person receives A//Q^^of
a dollar.’44
From this they conclude that while the welfare loss in both instances is 
the same, i.e, in each case the rich person gives up one dollar, the welfare 
gain is greater in the latter situation because the rich person knows that 
state intervention will collect more funds for each poor person.
This justification also falls on several counts. First, it is impossible to 
determine whether a person's welfare is somehow related to the well­
being of another, absent any market interaction. Even a voluntary act of 
giving would only indicate a momentary Interdependency, not some long­
standing relationship. Second, it is misleading to equate voluntary 
donations with involuntary taxation. An individual who gives up a dollar 
voluntarily benefits ex ante, otherwise he would not have given up the 
dollar. But we cannot conclude that the rich person benefits from giving 
up one dollar to the state because the transaction involves coercion. 
Third, welfare interdependency by itself cannot justify state intervention; this 
requires a value judgment.
Due and Friedlaender further state that even if perfect competition 
existed, society may not view its outcom e as "ethically desirable."” 5 
Therefore, "the government may have to impose redistributive taxes or 
subsidies not only to ensure that society reaches its preferred point on the 
utility possibility frontier, but also to ensure that society In fac t reaches its 
production possibility and utility possibility frontiers."’ ”
Their analysis is predicated on the existence of utility possibility 
frontiers. The fact that these frontiers have no relevance to human action 
is not broached. Neither is much attention given to what constitutes on 
ethical system from which to judge market allocations. Apparently, any 
ethical system will do, so long as It results from the democratic process. The 
possibility that the undesirable outcome may not be the result of ethical 
undesirability but sheer envy is not questioned.
’ 44|bid., p. 122. 
’ 45|bid., p. 119. 
’ 4®lbld.
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Moreover, why should anyone care that "society" considers the 
distribution of wealth "socially undesirable?" If one looked hard enough, 
any distribution could be found undesirable by some element of society. 
No one has a monopoly on envy. Precedence should not be given to the 
masses as any system of ethics that changed with the changing of minds 
would be tyranny, not ethics. The on/y question one should consider when 
speaking of income distribution is whether the distribution was the result of 
voluntary, non-invasive actions or whether it was the result of coercion.
Income redistribution is an affront to the free market. It negates the 
voluntary valuations of consumers. Mises writes that cries for income 
equality are based more on greed and envy than pure ethical grounds:
The inequality of incomes and wealth is an inherent feature of 
the market economy. Its elimination would entirely destroy the 
market economy. What those people who ask for equality 
have in mind is always an increase in their own power to 
consume. In endorsing the principle of equality as a political 
postulate nobody wants to share his own income with those 
who have less. When the American wage earner refers to 
equality, he means that the dividends of stockholders should 
be given to him. He does not suggest a curtailment of his own 
income for the benefit of those 95 per cent of the earth's 
population whose income is lower than his.” /
Inequality Is something to be cherished, not scorned. Were it not for 
inequality, man would hove had little Incentive to form society. Each 
person would go his own way, isolated from everyone else. O n c e  
individuals realized they could benefit from the skills and talents of others, 
the seeds of civilization were planted. Inequality leads to the division of 
labor and the subsequent increase in the standard of living. Any attempt to 
derail the division of labor through forced equality is a move tow a rd  
barbarism.” ®
Why stop at income redistribution? The burden, it seems, is on the 
egalitarian to prove why egalitarianism must stop at income. Why not 
extend it to all other areas of one's life? How about cognitive or facial
” 7Mises, Human Action, p. 840.
” ®See Rothbard, "Freedom, Inequality, Primitivism and the Division of
Labor.
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e q u a l i t y ? ” 9 ! 5 0  |\io coercive ac t of income distribution can be said to 
benefit social welfare because sucti an ac t requires ttia t one party lose 
wtiile anottier gains.
Furttiermore, income redistribution foils the Pareto criterion as 
taxation is required either directly or indirectly in the form of subsidies to 
alter any given allocation. Any attem pt to alter the voluntary "income 
distribution" of the market through state actions must be viewed as invasive 
and treated as such.
Taxation
According to the texts, taxation has both substitution and income 
effects. These forces have opposite effects: The substitution e ffect 
increases the incentive to engage in leisure and consumption by increasing 
the costs associated with work, while the income e ffect increases the 
incentive to work by reducing money income and thereby increasing the 
marginal utility a ttached to each dollar. Whether either e ffect will 
dominate the other is an empirical question.” ’ Thus, not all taxes will 
adversely affect production. But is this really an empirical question?
What is missing from this analysis is the universal fac t of time 
preference: Every act of taxation coercively increases the effective rate 
of time preference by reducing one's current as well as future income, 
thereby increasing the disutility of waiting. In addition, man must not only 
choose between production or leisure, but between producing with 
quicker, less p roductive  processes or longer, more productive  
p r o c e s s e s . ’ 52 The higher the time preference, the shorter the time structure
’49piew, The Politics of Procrustes, pp. 22,58.
’ 50Qn the logical extension of egalitarianism, see Vonnegut, "Harrison 
Bergeron."
’ 51 Hyman, Pubiic Finance, pp. 464-467.
’ 52Lengthening the structure of production necessitates th a t this 
lengthening be undertaken with the idea that these processes be more 
productive. No one would lengthen the production structure if that 
lengthening yielded a less productive process. The longer processes 
require savings to sustain the actors while they create capita l goods. 
Without savings, these individuals would starve because the rewards of
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of production, Witti this in mind, the effects of taxation ore no longer in 
doubt, The higher marginal utility placed on dollars will push individuals to 
obtain them more quickly. This can be accomplished through shorter 
periods of production, thereby increasing leisure time, or by obtaining 
money through political means.” 3 Both methods adversely im p a c t
production.’ 54
Furthermore, the income effect increases the tendency to engage 
in barter trade since such trades escape taxation.’ 55 This should be 
distinguished from above-ground putative barter exchanges. First, these 
exchanges utilize barter credits and thus obviate the double coincidence 
of wonts exclusive to barter trade but alien to money-based economic 
systems. Second, these transactions ore taxable and consequently less 
conducive to tax evasion. Taxation primarily affects underground barter. 
Barter trade Is a retrogression to the primitive living conditions of the post, 
for the double coincidence of wonts precludes rational, money-based 
cost accounting.’ 56
Taxation also Increases the incentive to engage in non-barter 
underground employment. An underground firm cannot be as productive 
as a comparative unfettered, above-ground firm because the former must 
forego the benefits of economies of scale. Should such a firm take 
advantage of these economies, it opens itself to possible discovery. These 
factors, combined with the substitution effect, push individuals to engage in
lengthy periods of production can take weeks, months or years before 
fructification (See Richard von StrigI, Capital and Production).
’ 5®Taxation has profound sociological Implications. The existence of a 
group of individuals having the legal sanction to plunder immediately raises 
the costs of homesteading, producing and contracting. Conversely, the 
costs of non-homesteading, non-producing and non-contracting are 
lowered. Individuals will tend to move from the former positions to the 
iotter, for one can nov/ engage in these predatory practices with impunity 
so long as he plays by the state's rules. (Hoppe, "The Economics and 
Sociology of Taxation, p. 35)
’54Hoppe, "The Economics and Sociology of Taxation," pp. 31-35.
’55|bid., p. 34.
’ 56To illustrate, imagine a firm that accep ted  every possible good as 
payment, e.g., bananas, tires, and shoes. How can the entrepreneur 
determine whether he has a made a profit or loss? Clearly, what's missing is 
a common denominator, a common medium of exchange. Until this is 
established, only subsistence standards-of-living are sustainable (See 
Salerno, "Mises and Hayek Dehomogenized").
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leisure and consumption and shorter rather than longer, roundabout 
m ethods of p roduction . This is a prescription for econom ic 
impoverishment,
The proxeologicoi theories of taxation refer not to absolute levels of 
production, but relative ones, A society tha t has a state-sanctioned 
parasite class will have a lower standard of living relative to the standard of 
living possible with lower taxation or absent taxation. Every tax or tax 
increase necessarily pushes society closer and closer to the barbaric past 
of hand-to-mouth existence.
Tax Equity
On the necessity of tax equity, Musgrave writes: "Everyone agrees 
that the tax system should be equitable, i.e., that each taxpayer should 
contribute his or her 'fair share' to the cost of government."i57
Musgrave argues that one method of achieving tax equity is through 
the application of the benefit p r i n c i p l e . i s s  f a x  regime of this sort would 
tax everyone according to their valuation of government services. "Unless 
the good in question is what economists call an 'inferior' good, consumer 
valuation may be expected to rise with i n c o m e . 5 9  The assumption here is 
that the rich benefit more from state than the poor, but this could only be 
the case if their incomes were dependent on the state. This is true for the 
holders of m onopoly grants and subsidies, but not for everyone else. 
Welfare recipients would hove to pay a tax covering their dole and the 
accom panying bureaucratic costs. Monopoly holders face the same 
predicament. What's the purpose in having such privileges and largesse if 
their beneficiaries must pay for them?i60
Yet, can there ever be tax equity? The political philosopher John C. 
Calhoun noted two types of individuals: taxpayers and t a x c o n s u m e r s . i ^ i
T 57Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice, p, 227. 
i58|bid„p, 228, 
i59|bid„ p, 229.
i50Rothbard, Power and Market, pp. 154-156.
i5iLence, Union and Liberty: The Poiiticai Philosophy of John C. Calhoun, pp.
17-19.
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Individuals who receive port or oil their income from the state are 
toxconsumers. Those who receive more in taxes than they pay are net 
taxconsumers and those who pay more than they receive are net 
taxpayers, As long os state employees receive their income from taxes, 
tax equity is out of the question, This is because state employees do not 
pay taxes. Rather, their incomes are paid out of taxes.i62
Tax Incidence
Austrian insights into the nature of tax incidence differ from that of 
mainstream economists. According to mainstream economists, a sales tax 
can be shifted forward onto consumers, either partially or entirely, 
Austrians assert otherwise.
In the texts, a sales "tax,,,forms a wedge between the gross or 
market price paid by the buyer and the net price received by the seller. 
Since the a d  valorem  is a function of price, it must now be shown as a 
change in the demand schedule. Moreover, since the tax is determined as 
a percentage of price, the adjustment is reflected in a swivel rather than a 
shift of the schedule."i63 This analysis violates the ceteris paribus restriction. 
There is no reason to assume that the demand curve has changed in 
response to the the tax: The demand curve is a given and all economic 
effects ore deduced from this fact. 1^ 4
A producer sets a price for his product at the point he believes net 
revenue will be maximized. He does not charge a higher price because 
he believes the demand above the chosen price is elastic.^^ 5 To charge a 
higher price, ceteris paribus, would result in a loss of net revenue. When a 
soles tax or soles tax increase is enacted, the producer cannot raise his 
prices without incurring a loss in revenue. Of course, this does not mean
152To illustrate, imagine that taxes are abolished one year, How would state 
employees pay their taxes? They couldn't because their incomes are 
dependent on taxes. That state employees' paychecks reflect tax 
withholding is merely an accounting fiction. 
i63[y|usgrave. Public Finance in Theory and Practice, p. 270. 
i64|-|oppe, "The Economics and Sociology of Taxation," pp. 37-38. 
i55jf producers can effortlessly shift taxes onto consumers, then one must 
ask: Why wait for the tax or tax increase to raise prices?
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that he won't try to do so. But if demand has not changed in the meantime, 
producers must experience unsold surpluses at the higher prices.^ 56
At first, the entire burden is borne by the producer. The DMVP of 
factors of the taxed industries will be reduced. Non-specific factors will 
move to higher-remunerative industries.^57 Marginal firms will exit the 
industry. Firms that don't exit the industry will reduce production due to 
decreased profitability. As the number of producers and the incentive to 
produce diminishes, so will the the supply of their product and, 
consequently, prices will increase.''58 Thus, consumers bear part of the 
burden from sales taxes, but in no sense is the tax shifted onto them, for 
shifting implies ease and directness and this is clearly not the case.
156a  general sales tax cannot increase the overall level of prices. Such on 
occurrence requires that everyone spend more on everything. This is 
impossible without counterfeiting-induced inflation or without a decrease in 
the demand for money.
i57Some factors may find a higher DMVP In other industries, particularly in 
those where the tax proceeds are spent, in the long run, "loss[es] in gross 
revenue [ore] imputed back to interest income by capitalists and to wages 
and rents earned by original factors-labor and ground land. (Rothbard, 
Power and Market, p. 90. 
i58Rothbord, Power and Market, pp. 88-93.
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Conclusion.
The errors of public finance are fundamental and can be summed 
up as follows:
(1) the use of interpersonal utility comparisons
(2) violating the wertfrei nature of economics by deriving ethical 
judgments from purely economic postulates
(3) the failure to provide a starting point for Pareto optimality
(4) the failure to provide a theory of property rights or a theory 
of ethics from which to make value judgments
(5) the failure to use the individual as the starting point of all 
economic analyses
(6) aping the epistemology of physics in the use of economic 
assumptions
Economics cannot justify any role of the state. Any act of the state 
must, by definition, involve coercion. The state can only benefit Peter by 
robbing Paul. As such, all state actions involve winners and losers. The 
impossibility of interpersonal welfare comparisons prevents us from saying 
whether the utility gains of the winners outweigh the losses of the losers.
In addition, for an economist to advocate state intervention on the 
basis of econom ic analysis necessarily violates the value-free nature of 
econom ics. As advocates of state intervention, economists q u a  
consultants are complicit in the mulcting and predatory practices of the 
s t a t e . 1 5 9 , 1 7 0  They are no better than the individual who aides thieves by 
consulting with them on the best methods with which to rob their victims.
i590n the impossibility of value-free consulting, see Rothbard, Toward A 
Reconstrucfion, p. 25.
i70The term "predatory practices" has been reserved exclusively for the 
actions of cutthroat firms. This is incorrect. As we have seen, all actions of 
the state involve predations. The state is the true predator.
70
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Economists must put on end to their role as state apologists, This will 
go far to overturn the negative image of economists presented by Mises: 
"The developm ent of a profession of economists is an offshoot of 
interventionism. The professional economist is the specialist who is 
instrumental in designing various measures of government interference with 
business. He is on expert in the field of economic legislation, which today 
invariably aims at hindering the operation of the market economy."'7i
'I'l Mises, Human Action, p. 869.
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